




The Dissertation Committee for Seyed Reza Yousefi
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
Essays on Pricing under Uncertainty and Heterogeneity







Essays on Pricing under Uncertainty and Heterogeneity
in the Finance-Trade-Growth Nexus
by
Seyed Reza Yousefi, B.S., M.S.Eco.
DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
August 2013
This dissertation is dedicated to my dear parents,
Seyed Masoud Yousefi and Maliheh Vaezian,
who let me choose my own path;
and to my lovely wife,
Pareesa,
whom I cannot live without.
This was possible because of their love, support and encouragement.
Acknowledgments
I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Andrew Whinston, for
his kindness, patience, support, and guidance. I am grateful to Tom Wiseman,
Max Stinchcombe, and Jason Abrevaya for their constructive suggestions and
ideas during the presentations, meetings and classes. I wish to thank Adolfo
Barajas and I am highly indebted to him for all his support and guidance. I
appreciate his advices and it has been an honor for me to work with him.
The first chapter is joint with Andrew Whinston and Huaxia Rui. I wish
to thank Tom Wiseman, Max Stinchcombe, Laurent Mathevet, and seminar
participants at INFORMS 2011 for their insightful comments and valuable
suggestions. The second chapter is a joint research with Ralph Chami and
Adolfo Barajas. I thank Christian Ebeke, Era Dabla-Norris, Fuad Hasanov,
Thorsten Beck, and seminar participants at the Middle East and Central Asian
Department and at the joint IMF, World Bank, CFSP, and DFID Conference
for very helpful comments on previous drafts. I am also grateful to Dean
Corbae, all committee members and seminar participants at the University of
Texas at Austin for their helpful comments on the third chapter.
v
Essays on Pricing under Uncertainty and Heterogeneity
in the Finance-Trade-Growth Nexus
Publication No.
Seyed Reza Yousefi, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2013
Supervisor: Andrew Whinston
My dissertation consists of empirical and theoretical essays on Microe-
conomic Theory and International Economics. The first chapter discusses the
existence and characterization of a model that determines producer’s opti-
mal pricing and allocation rule as a preannounced markdown schedule. The
mechanism focuses on pricing and operational implications of allotting scarce
resources when customers are heterogeneous in their valuations and sensitivi-
ties towards availability of product. The proposed mechanism suggests that a
carefully designed multistep markdown pricing could achieve optimal revenue
when selling a single unit. However, to sell multiple units, monopolist should
modify the implementation of markdown pricing by either hiding the num-
ber of available products or selling them via contingent contracts and upfront
payments.
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In the second essay, we study the heterogeneity of finance and growth
nexus across countries. Our paper contributes to the literature by investigating
whether this impact differs across regions and types of economy. Using a rich
dataset, cross-section and dynamic panel estimation results suggest that the
beneficial effect of financial deepening on economic growth in fact displays
measurable heterogeneity; it is generally smaller in oil exporting countries; in
certain regions, such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and in
lower-income countries. Further analysis suggests that these differences might
be driven by regulatory/supervisory characteristics and related to differing
performance on financial access for a given level of depth.
The third chapter analyzes contraction of exports in the aftermath of
severe financial crises and tests for its heterogeneity across different industries
and based on their credit conditions. It provides a theoretical framework to
provide insight on why sectors are hit disproportionately during and in the
aftermath of severe financial distresses, and confirms most of them with em-
pirical estimations. The findings suggest that industries with greater reliance
on outside financing and fewer shares of tangible assets experience greater
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Chapter 1
Optimal Markdown and Priority Pricing with
Demand Uncertainty
Markdown and priority pricing schemes facilitate complex pricing sched-
ules for sellers and enable strategic buyers to purchase products at desirable
prices. In a preannounced markdown mechanism, the price of a product de-
clines over time according to a specific schedule until it sells out, inducing high
value customers to purchase the item earlier and at higher prices. In priority
pricing scheme, each contract is assigned a ranking order and a corresponding
price, according to which supply is rationed among customers. The higher
customers pay, the earlier they obtain the product or the higher quality of
service they receive. Research by Wilson (1989), Stokey (1979), Harris and
Raviv (1981), Elmaghraby et al. (2008) and Horner and Samuelson (2011),
among others investigate optimal allocation and pricing schedule, in diverse
environments, varying from single unit to multiunit demand, from known to
uncertain supply or demand and from complete to incomplete information en-
vironments. This paper considers an environment with uncertain demand and
discusses the existence and characterization of a model that determines pro-
ducer’s optimal pricing and allocation rule as a preannounced and multistep
markdown pricing schedule. The mechanism focuses on the operational im-
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plications of allotting scarce resources, when, at the same time, customers are
heterogeneous in their valuations and in their sensitivities towards availability
of the product. The proposed mechanism suggests that a carefully designed
multistep markdown pricing could achieve optimal revenue when selling a sin-
gle unit. However, when the monopolist has multiple units, he should modify
implementation of markdown pricing by either hiding the number of available
products at each stage or selling them via contingent contracts and upfront
payments. Further we discuss the inefficient outcome of “commodity burn-
ing”, where the monopolist may consider disposing of a portion of supply in
equilibrium. And finally, we illustrate that a monopolist’s optimal scheme
includes offering supplementary insurance to the risk averse customers.
1.1 Introduction
Price skimming is a marketing strategy where the seller sets an initially
high price for the product and lowers it over time. Thus, it enables a manufac-
turer, who has marketing power, to extract a greater proportion of consumer
surplus. Customers with higher valuations are incentivized to purchase at ear-
lier stages, and these higher prices insure them against the product selling out.
Stokey (1979, 1988) was one of the first to use such a model to investigate the
emergence of higher quality products in a learning-by-doing framework.
Recent technological improvements in electronic commerce have en-
abled retailers to exercise more innovative and complicated pricing schemes.
One such unique format is automated and decreasing scheduled prices, called
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“Automatic Markdown E-commerce”. For example “Pricetack.com”, an e-
commerce website enables sellers to offer their products for sale using a novel
falling price schedule. Manufacturers specify a schedule of falling prices with
short time intervals between the markdowns. Buyers may purchase the prod-
uct at the initial price or wait for more discounts and a better deal in the
future. However, buyers risk losing the product to other potential customers
if the item sells out before it falls to the targeted low price. Figure 1.1 pro-
vides an example, a cell-phone jammer offered with a falling price schedule,
at the “Pricetack.com” website. The initial price of the product was $320, on
October 4, 2011, until when the price was marked down by $20. The price
would further drop to $280 on October 14 and $240 on November 3 if it did
not sell out by then. The same mechanism is used widely and at a fast growing
rate by other websites such as “Pricefalls.com”. Figure 1.2 shows how price
of an item drops according to a preannounced schedule until it sells out or
the supplier ends the listing. Filene’s Basement (Figure 1.3), a retailer, also
employed markdown system in its Boston store until September 2007 when it
underwent construction. Similarly, “Next to New,” a retail store located in
Austin, TX, implements markdown pricing for its products that include house-
hold furnishing items and clothing. Price items are reduced every 30 days at
a preannounced rate (usually at 25%) until they sell out. Further examples
have been practiced by other retailers, such as “plunging price” implemented
by Sam’s club referred to by Elmaghraby et al. (2008), in Dutch flower auction
known as Aalsmeer flower auction (Figure 1.4), and in fashion markets.
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Priority services implement a similar mechanism to discriminate be-
tween customers. Supplier provides a menu of options with different prices
and service orders, where customers should pay higher for a better service
ranking. Afterwards, when uncertainties are realized, supply becomes rationed
according to the service ranks of the contracts. We see a strong link between
these models and automated markdowns. The higher price customers pay, the
earlier they obtain the product, or the higher quality of service they receive.
Seminal works by Wilson (1989), Chao and Wilson (1987) and Oren, Smith
and Wilson (1985) investigate markets with priority pricing schedules, such
as the electricity markets. Wilson (1989) considers the effect of uncertainty
in supply and excludes randomness in demand. Chao and Wilson (1987) for-
mulate efficient rationing in the presence of demand uncertainty, while Oren,
Smith and Wilson (1985) take capacity fees as a part of total tariff and illus-
trate how a specified capacity with known date of delivery should be priced.
However, optimal pricing and rationing is still not obvious in the pricing con-
text, especially when supply is scarce and demand is uncertain, and in the
presence of customers who strategically choose the time of purchase.
Although preannounced and priority pricing schemes segment customers
based on their valuations, they may lead to the “strategic waiting” phe-
nomenon. Here, people who are willing to pay high price for a merchandise
might still postpone their purchase to get the product at clearance price rather
than buying the item earlier. However, if the pricing scheme can somehow cre-
ate incentives for those with higher valuations so that they purchase products
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at higher prices, the retailer would be able to extract more from the market by
performing a second degree price discrimination1. However, knowing customer
preferences and using non-linear prices designed for different qualities of prod-
uct, suppliers may capture a large proportion of the surplus by distinguishing
between types of consumers.
In this paper, we study the pricing scheme in a model where demand
is uncertain. We employ Mechanism Design, which is a standard tool to solve
profit maximizing problems, in order to design supplier’s optimal resource allo-
cation. The goal of Mechanism Design is to achieve profit maximizing solutions
where customers are incentivized to attain purchasing behaviors aligned with
the objectives of the designer. For instance, Vickrey (1961) Clarke (1971)
Groves (1973) mechanism, known as the VCG mechanism, designs payment
schedules or money transfers in order to implement second degree price dis-
crimination. We employ models of priority and markdown pricing schemes and
explore the possibility of implementing optimal mechanism via revenue maxi-
mizing pricing schedules. In addition, we allow the seller to have commitment
over pricing schedule and argue that dynamic pricing should be abandoned in
such environments. The present study sheds light on the following questions
by combining previous streams of the literature:
• Is it possible to obtain optimal revenue via markdown pricing scheme?
How should sellers implement such mechanisms?
1In second degree price discrimination, sellers do not directly observe types of customers,
and therefore, are not able to fully extract consumer surplus.
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• Is it optimal for a seller to commit to a specific pricing path? If so,
should he dispose of a fraction of the unsold products?
• How do the answers to the above questions differ when buyers are risk
averse? How about the case when supplier has more than one item to
sell?
Previous works have partly addressed these questions. However, a
comprehensive study is missing in the literature to explain the growing and
widespread use of muliple-step markdown pricing especially by online retail-
ers. Diverse streams of past studies find it optimal to implement a sealed bid
auction in the beginning period and ignore the dynamic setting. Other studies
solve for the best pricing strategies when seller has no commitment over prices
in the future. Therefore, it is appealing to understand how and why mecha-
nisms with committed pricing schedules are becoming more popular. These
issues together with the need for a deeper analysis of pricing multiple units
have been the motivations for the present study.
Given that the strategic waiting of higher value customers is considered
a loss to retailers, the literature provides operational policy advice such as sug-
gesting suppliers offer markdowns, limited availability, advance discounts, and
higher future prices, to dissuade high value customers to postpone their pur-
chase. Su and Zhang (2008) analyze a form of retailers’ price discrimination
where they may inform customers that future purchasing opportunities would
be unappealing. The signaling could be performed with either future high
6
prices or limited availability. Segal (2003) considers a supplier with multiple
units of a commodity who is willing to sell them through an auction to cus-
tomers with single unit demand. He finds that, when valuations are private
information, an optimal pricing schedule should charge the customers based on
the other customers’ bids. Su (2007) studies capacity rationing, Aviv and Paz-
gal (2008) consider preannounced pricing and committed capacity planning,
and Yin et al. (2009) study a pricing mechanism and compare the profitabil-
ity of two inventory display formats: display all and display one. The latter
study focuses on a setting in which monopolist announces a fixed price path
(a premium and end-of-period price) and manipulates customer expectations
on the availability via an appropriate display format. Although the framework
is very limited and allows for only two types of customers and only two price
steps, the findings have intriguing operational implications and provide sup-
port for the superiority of display one over display all format. Lazear (1986)
also addresses a similar question and investigates price dynamics when there
are fixed number, T, of sale periods: regular and clearance prices when T = 2.
N customers arrive in each period with homogenous but unknown to the seller
valuations arrive and the seller chooses strictly falling price schedule to attain
the highest possible revenue. However, this analysis ignore the fact the cus-
tomers’ heterogeneity except in the dimension that some customers may be
serious buyers and others may be just shoppers walking around in the store.
Furthermore, seller has no choice on the number of sale periods in this frame-
work. However, it was one of the novel ideas at the time and a later study
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by Pashigian and Bowen (1991) investigate the Lazear (1986) model empiri-
cally. A comprehensive reference on these topics could be found in Aviv et al.
(2009). Other relevant studies are Rao and Peterson (1998) and Van Mieghem
(2000) who solve for the optimal pricing of priority services in a queueing con-
text, and Anderson and Dana (2009) who state the conditions under which a
supplier chooses not to offer advance buy discounts.
Other types of price discrimination could be performed by last minute
and opaque selling strategies, as discussed by Jerath et al. (2009). The Price-
line.com or Hotwire.com websites, for instance, offer hotel deals with approxi-
mate locations and last minute flight deals. Recent studies have also focused
on the impact of the intertemporal behavior of customers on producers’ profits
and the mechanisms suppliers could employ for revenue management. Firms
may also perform uncommon price discrimination for the purpose of profit
maximization. According to Deneckere and McAfee (1996), one of the ob-
served strategies of manufacturers has been intentional damaging a portion of
their goods in order to price discriminate. Firms may intentionally produce
their goods at lower qualities with almost the same marginal cost to achieve
higher profits.
We build our model on the previous streams of literature who inves-
tigate price discrimination when supply is scarce relative to demand. Harris
and Raviv (1981) focus on an environment with uncertain demand and show
that when supply is abundant, fixed pricing is optimal. In the case of scarce
supply, they illustrate how a Vickery mechanism should be used by a pro-
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ducer. Another study by Liu and Van-Ryzin (2008) points out that in the
case of preannounced prices, optimal strategy for a monopolist could be to
deliberately understock a product and cause shortage in order to create incen-
tive for higher value customers to buy the product earlier and at higher prices.
Elmaghraby et al. (2008) extend those findings to the optimal mechanisms
in the presence of multiunit demand under both complete and incomplete in-
formation. They find that under known demand structure and scarce supply,
a two step markdown schedule is optimal. Moreover, they show that under
certain conditions, private and incomplete information, three step markdowns
might be implemented by a monopolist. However, they claim that seller will
never find it optimal to employ more than three steps. The recent paper by
Osadchiy and Vulcano (2010) build on Elmaghraby et al. (2008) and argue
that when customers are heterogeneous in their valuations and arrival time, a
binding reservations mechanism could be superior to markdown pricing when
it is costly for customers to wait for the product. However, they compare
their model with a simple two step markdown pricing and there is no uncer-
tainty in the demand structure. In a related study, Krishna (2002) provides
optimal auctions and revenue equivalence between different sets of prices in a
multiperiod setup. Customers are independently and identically drawn from
a known distribution in his framework. He shows that multiple unit auctions
share two common features: revenue equivalence and prices following a mar-
tingale process, i.e., prices in the following period are expected to be the same
as the current price and knowledge of past prices will never help predict future
9
price levels.
The last set of relevant research include the work by McAfee and Vin-
cent (1997), Skreta (2006), Horner and Samuelson (2011), and McAfee and
Vincent (1993) who solve the pricing problem of a monopolist unable of com-
mitting to future prices. Skreta (2006) shows that a seller with full bargaining
power may post prices in each period. She makes a prominent contribution to
the dynamic pricing schemes since other studies’ methodologies do not apply
to the frameworks in which seller behaves sequentially. The reason is that the
revelation principle is invalid in such cases and it makes the analysis too com-
plicated to solve for an equilibrium without applying the principle. McAfee and
Vincent (1997) investigate a closely related problem where the seller chooses
a sequentially rational mechanism against finitely many buyers. They find
that the seller implements a sequence of first price or second price auctions.
Time horizon is infinite, and therefore, seller lacks the ability to effectively
enforce a reserve price. In another relevant study by Horner and Samuelson
(2011) seller sets prices in discrete steps to finite number of customers. Be-
cause of the existence of a deadline to sell the items, seller benefits from having
some bargaining power, and therefore, the outcome differs from that by Coase
(1972), known as the Coase conjecture. Under certain conditions, the conjec-
ture shows that a monopolist will compete with itself over different periods
of sales and could not earn positive profit. The reason is simply because the
retailer has no commitment over future prices. In addition, the research by
McAfee and Vincent (1993), studies the declining price auctions of identical
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items that are sold sequentially. They find that it is necessary to assume non
decreasing absolute risk aversion for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium
bidding functions in a falling price setting. Otherwise, outcomes may be in-
efficient with positive probability. The study differs from others in that we
focus on the optimality of declining prices (maximum revenue to seller) while
they question the efficiency of mechanism (maximum social welfare).
This paper considers the environments where there is uncertainty in de-
mand and formulates the optimal pricing schemes for a monopolist. It shows
that uncertainty enables producer to further squeeze customers by performing
greater number of markdowns. Therefore, the current study adds to the three
streams of literature and characterizes optimal pricing schemes when seller
has commitment power against finite number of customers. Firstly, absent
risk aversion and income effects, we demonstrate that when demand is uncer-
tain, multistep markdown pricing is optimal for a service provider, and it is
superior to the frequently used two step markdowns. We further study the
case of customers with multiple units of demand and find that offering contin-
gent contracts is optimal for the retailer and superior to the implementation
of markdown schemes. Therefore, the retailer can attain higher profits from
the market by enforcing contingent contracts rather than employing a prean-
nounced pricing scheme. Moreover, we study the case of risk averse customers
and find that offering insurance options to customers is optimal for the retailer
and also pareto improving. In other words, when customers are sensitive to
the quality of service or availability of product, monopolist and customers all
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benefit from having the retailer, or a third party, supplement contracts with
insurance. Therefore, retailer can attain higher profits from market by en-
forcing a preannounced pricing scheme with upfront payments and insurance
options, and customers will be better off hedging themselves against risks of
service disruption or unavailability of desired product. Table 1.1 provides a
summary of related research in pricing against strategic customers compared
with our study.
In addition, we illustrate how markdown or priority pricing schedules
generate inefficiencies. We argue that a retailer may intentionally dispose of a
portion of its products rather than putting them up for sale. In other words,
decision of a supplier shall include “commodity burning” if the realized demand
for higher prices falls below a particular limit. The purpose is to discourage
higher value customers to wait until the last minute for clearance sales or
further discounts. Thus, although the decision to throw away a fraction of
products is inefficient in a social-welfare maximization point of view, it should
be used by retailers to prevent the strategic waiting phenomenon in order to
increase profits.
Our mechanism is a type of second degree price discrimination. It is
different from first degree price discrimination and the seller can not extract
the whole surplus since he does not know the valuations of customers. The
equilibrium prices show that each customer (except the lowest type who pays
his/her own valuation) pays lower than his/her valuation. The differential
amount - the difference between valuation and payment - is called ”rent” and it
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increases as type increases, i.e., higher types receive higher rents. The reason is
that high value customers have private information and the mechanism should
give them greater rent to provide incentive for them to reveal true valuations.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 1.2 provides a
model based on priority services and markdown pricing in the presence of
uncertain demand for a single unit of product. It characterizes the revenue
maximizing allocation and pricing scheme, and pursues with the case where the
seller has multiple units to sell. Section 1.3 discusses the optimal allocation to
risk averse customers and characterizes an equilibrium with upfront payments
and insurance schemes. Finally, Section 1.4 concludes, provides operational
management implications and outlines questions and future lines of research.
1.2 Model
We find it a reasonable assumption to consider commitment to a spe-
cific pricing path for retailers with multiple number of products who consider
profitability of future sales as well. One should note that some retailers com-
mit to a specific announcement and stick to it even if it turns out not to be
optimal. Retailers such as “pricefalls.com” may find it profitable to change
the price path of an item after they observe its sale at an initial price, but they
may also find it too costly to do so. Similar websites who run parallel auctions
and proactively seek more products to sell on their website, will threaten the
credibility of pricing schedules for their other products if they forgo the prede-
termined pricing and start selling in a sequentially rational way. Furthermore,
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pricing with no commitment has other significant disadvantage for sellers. As
Coase (1972) argues, when a seller has no commitment power, multistep pric-
ing leads to zero profit - due to the strategic behavior of the customers and
that the seller competes with himself over different periods.
The theoretical model consists of a profit maximizing monopolist who
provides a product with a corresponding price schedule. On the other side,
each customer maximizes her expected utility given available options. All
future prices are determined at an initial date and before the realization of
uncertainties. We show that a retailer benefits from the uncertain world and
extracts more from customers by exercising priority or markdown schemes. In
this section, we start with a model where the monopolist has a single item
for sale and solve for optimal mechanisms including preannounced markdowns
and priority pricing. We postpone the discussion of multiunit sale until Section
1.2.2 where the supplier has a fixed and commonly known stock of product.
We formulate the solution and provide the optimal pricing schedule in both
single unit and multiunit cases. Furthermore, we compare priority pricing with
preannounced markdowns and argue that it is not optimal to sell sequentially
when multiple units are for sale.
The monopolist is risk neutral and has a commonly known fixed supply,
S, which is equal to one unit in this Section. The seller has already paid all the
costs to produce, i.e., sunk costs, and we assume there are no expenses regard-
ing storage. Also, the object has no value for the seller if unsold and may be
disposed of at the end of the sales season. On the other side, customers are het-
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erogeneous in their valuations for the product. For instance, a celebrity might
value a fashion clothing more than others, or as another example, an auto-
mobile manufacturing company might value the quality of electricity, in terms
of lower rate of interruptions, more than a residential consumer2. Further-
more, we assume that the prices are announced before the demand is realized.
Customers’ valuations are private information and therefore, unobservable to
others in the market. There are finite, M , with valuations {v1, v2, ..., vM}
drawn independently from an identical distribution with cumulative density
function F (.) (where f(.) denotes the probability density function)3.
Furthermore, possible valuations are equally distanced from each other
over the normalized interval between zero and one, i.e., {θ1 = 1N , θ2 =
2
N
, ..., θN =
N
N
}. For simplicity, we consider a distribution where each possible valuation
is equally likely to occur with probability 1
N
.
Conditional on consuming the product, expected utility of a consumer
with valuation vi is represented by:
U(vi, p) = u(vi − p),
where p denotes the price and u(.) is the utility function. The utility function
2Nuclear plants, for instance, are highly sensitive not only to electricity blackouts but
also towards power sags, or undervoltage even for up to a few seconds.
3In reality, only some of the whole population are aware of, for example, pricetack.com
and check their website. A seller should implement markdown pricing to target this group.
However, it does not mean that people who are not aware of the website do not need the
product or are casual buyers. It just means that seller need not worry about them and he
should have a good approximation of the distribution of the people who are checking his
website. It is therefore crucial that seller considers the distribution of his audience rather
than the total population, if different.
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is assumed to be linear in our framework until section 1.3 where we address
the case with risk averse customers. One way of selling the product is the fixed
price scheme. In a fixed price sale, seller posts a price p and customers whose
valuations are greater than the price, if there is any, purchase the product.
However, there is a better alternative for the seller in which he considers
uncertainties in demand and decides to take that in account together with
an effort to discriminate between different types of customers for a higher
expected revenue. But how should he define the price path? and is it the best
possible scheme, in terms of expected revenue, to sell the item via markdowns?
One could consider three methods of price discrimination between dif-
ferent types of customers. One method is to implement a falling price sched-
ule as performed by “Pricefalls.com” and “Pricetack.com”. These websites
announce a future price path for each product with exact markdowns. On
the demand side, people observe the price schedule and pick up the stage to
step in and purchase the product. As illustrated by Figure 1.1, the retailer
has specified five markdowns to sell a cell phone jammer at the Pricetack.com
website. Customers pick their favorite price and wait for the time when the
price drops to that specific level. A strategic buyer may wait for lower prices,
but she also faces the risk of unavailability if she decides to postpone her pur-
chase. The second method to sell the product, as described by Horner and
Samuelson (2011), is to implement sequentially rational sales in which price is
update in every single period in a dynamic environment. Therefore, the seller
will have no commitment on the plunging prices and one may even observe a
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jump in prices since no announcements for future prices are credible. Finally,
we consider the option that the seller implements a sealed bid auction in the
first period. Customers announce their bids via sealed envelopes, or with pro-
viding their credit card number, and the seller allocates the product to the
highest bids with prices determined by the mechanism. As we will discuss,
the latter mechanism achieves optimal profit, the maximum surplus a seller
could extract via a pricing scheme, but it suffers from being too complicated
to practice everywhere. One restriction to implement such a mechanism is
to have all customers bid at the beginning of the sale and the seller allocate
the good in a static framework. However, customers are usually more conve-
nient with observing dynamic prices with gradual changes rather than deciding
about their desirable bid in a complicated mechanism. Furthermore, a retailer
may be able to attract more customers, especially those not educated, with
simpler and easier to understand pricing methods. To summarize, we com-
pare the following three mechanisms and discuss managerial implications and
optimality of each scheme (discussion of the C scheme is available Section 1.3):
A) A menu of priority services (static solution)
B) Dynamic pricing with a preannounced and committed path
C) Priority pricing with upfront payments and supplementary insurance
One should note that people are served according to a priority allocation
rule in model A. Supplier implements a mechanism by allowing customers to
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choose among a set of priority orders, r ∈ [rT = (N − T + 1), ..., rN−1 =
2, rN = 1], where 1 ≤ T ≤ N . The first or top ranking order, r = 1 or
r = rN , is served first with the highest probability of receiving the product,
and the lowest ranking order, r = N − T + 1 or r = rT , is served last with the
least probability. Each priority level is paired with a corresponding price and
the menu of contracts is denoted by < r, p(r) >. Monopolist offers different
choices to discriminate between different types of customers, and since there
are N types in the market, maximum number of choices in the menu should
be N which occurs when T = 1, i.e., offering more options than the number
of types is redundant. The second plan, B, is similar to the priority pricing A
in the way that it contains a set of prices implemented as markdown pricing.
Rather than offering a menu of prices and ranking orders, the seller may start
with an initial price pN , lower it to pN−1 in the second period and continue
decreasing prices on a preannounced path until price reaches pT in period
N − T + 1. However, the difference with plan A is in that the sale is not
implemented in a single period. It starts with an initial high price, continues
plunging according to a committed schedule and terminates either at price pT
or when the item sells out before price reaches that floor level. We will show
that both plans, A and B, are equivalent and both are optimal when there
is a single unit for sale. However, their difference is significant when there
are multiple units for sale (discussed in Section 1.2.2). Our “Prictack.com”
example, Figure 1.1, is a perfect example for plan B. The retailer has specified
five markdowns to sell a cell phone jammer. People observe the price path and
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make their mind about when to step in and purchase the product. Finally,
plan C implements a mechanism similar to plan A with the difference that the
seller offers supplementary insurance with the menu of priority options. The
seller bears more risk and pays all or a portion of customer’s money back if
she is not served after the winning merchants receive their products.
1.2.1 Optimal Pricing
Thus far, the monopolist’s problem to solve for a mechanism with max-
imum revenue seems very complicated. Customers are strategic and there are
too many ways to implement price discrimination. However, the complication
could be simplified by employing the revelation principle:
Theorem 1.2.1. Revelation Principle4: for any scheme in our incomplete
information game, there exists a payoff equivalent scheme with an equilibrium
which is both direct and truthtelling, i.e., players report their types truthfully.
Using the revelation principle, we can limit our search to the set of
mechanisms in which customers report their types truthfully. Therefore, we
consider cases in which customer i has a valuation vi ∈ {θ1 = 1N , θ2 =
2
N
, ..., θN =
N
N
}, and given truthfullness of other customer, she should not
have incentive to report any valuation except the true one, i.e., v̂i = vi.
Since there are N possible valuations for each customer, when a rep-
resentative customer i reports the highest valuation v̂i = θN , it is as if he
4A proof of the theorem can be found in Myerson (1979).
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has chosen number 1 in the ranking among all possible ranking orders, i.e.,
r(θN) = 1. Similarly if someone declares v̂i = θN−1, it is as if he has chosen
ranking number 2, i.e., r(θN−1) = 2, and the person who announces that his
type is the lowest, v̂i = θ1, means that his rank is N among the customers,
i.e., r(θ1) = N . Therefore, from now on, we assume that each person i with
valuation vi declares his type by choosing a ranking order, r̂i. The choice will
be truthtelling in the new messaging space if r̂i = r(vi) ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, where
r(.) is the function defined above, which maps valuations to the ranking or-
ders. The function is one to one and strictly decreasing, i.e., the higher the
valuation, the lower the ranking order. This function allows us to use the nice
intuitive features of pricing based on ranking orders while at the same time, it
keeps the mechanism direct, i.e., as if customers message their types directly.
For simplicity purposes we denote r(θl) with rl, ∀l ∈ {1, ..., N}.
We denote the allocation rule for customer i, in an optimal mecha-
nism, by gi(r̂i, r̂−i), which is a function of her choice, r̂i, and the choices of all
other people in the market, r̂−i (which is a vector that contains ranking orders
chosen by all people other than customer i). A customer who chooses the
rank r̂i, will be served according to the allocation rule gi(r̂i, r̂−i) and should
transfer ti(r̂i, r̂−i) which depends on the declarations of all customers. There-
fore, given report r̂ = (r̂1, ..., r̂M) by all customers, seller allocates supply to
them according to the allocation rule g(r̂) = [g1(r̂), ..., gM(r̂)], and transfer
rule t(r̂) = [t1(r̂), ..., tM(r̂)].
According to the revelation principle, we are interested in the truthtelling
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schemes in which players report their rankings according to their true types,
r̂i = r(vi). Therefore, we denote truthtelling reports by r and distinguish any
other report by r̂ for clarity purposes. Therefore, assuming that all other play-
ers are ranked truthfully, individual i takes expectation over other consumers’
choices, r−i, and obtains expected probability of receiving the product, qi(r̂i),
and expected payment, pi(r̂i), for service order r̂i as:
qi(r̂i) = E−i[gi(r̂i, r−i)], (1.1)
pi(r̂i) = E−i[ti(r̂i, r−i)], (1.2)
where E−i denotes expectation taken over all possible states of demand for all
customers except i, given that everybody else is truthful.
If customer i with valuation vi is willing to participate in the game, she
will expect to receive the product with probability qi(r̂i) at the expected price
pi(r̂i) if she chooses the ranking order r̂i. If she decides to take the contract
with ranking order r̂i, her expected utility will be:
Ui(r̂i; vi) = E−i[u(gi(r̂i, r−i)vi − ti(r̂i, r−i))], (1.3)
which will reduce to the following expression if customers are represented by
quasilinear utility functions:
Ui(r̂i; vi) = E−i[gi(r̂i, r−i)vi − ti(r̂i, r−i)] = qi(r̂i)vi − pi(r̂i). (1.4)
Therefore, due to the incomplete information environment, customers
face an allocation rule with corresponding prices, and report their ranking
21
orders (or their valuations, equivalently) based on their privately known in-
formation. We assume that if a customer decides to stay out of market, she
will gain zero utility. Therefore, we normalize outside option’s utility to zero,
and interpret it as not taking any contract. Therefore, we can formulate the
customer’s maximization problem as:
max{0,maxr̂i{Ui(r̂i; vi)}}. (1.5)
We can see that the expected utility function, if non-zero, satisfies the





) > 0. In short, the assumption is a sufficiency condition to insure
that any monotonic allocation q(.) is implementable. Therefore, the designer
can search over the monotonic allocation mechanisms for an optimal solution.
This mechanism should offer a better deal to higher value agents. Otherwise,
in any mechanism that higher types face punishment for reporting true values,
they have incentives to misreport themselves as lower types.
The timing is as follows: First, supplier designs a mechanism to maxi-
mize his profit from allocating supply to the heterogenous customers. For any
set of choices by the customers ( ranking order r, or equivalently, valuations),
a contract specifies payments for the bidders. Then, customers choose their
ranking order from the seller’s menu. And finally, seller serves customers and
charges them according to the allocation rule.
The monopolist designs a mechanism to incentivize higher value cus-
tomers to purchase earlier at higher price. Two distinct structures could be
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assumed for pricing, one with static implementation, where customers bid in
advance and choose a ranking order with a corresponding price where delivery
is contingent on the realized demand (Plan A), and another with dynamic
markdowns where price plunges down until it reaches a certain price floor or
it sells out (Plan B). For the case of linear utilities, we show that for any opti-
mal mechanism A, there exists an equivalent scheme, B, which is implemented
dynamically and according to a preannounced price path.
In the simple case of a two period sale, for instance, the monopolist
decides to sell at PH in period one, and if any product left, at PL in period
2. A consumer buys at the first period if utility of purchasing at the higher
price is greater than buying cheaper but with higher risk of unavailability. In
other words, the customer purchases the product earlier if the following IC5
condition holds for the case of risk neutral customers: q1vi−PH ≥ q2vi−PL
where qi is the probability of obtaining the good in period i.
We start by solving for the optimal mechanism. We show that the
monopolist can obtain maximum attainable profit by running mechanism A
and that there exists an equivalent B scheme (5 markdowns in the example by
Figure 1.1). When offered a menu of priority services, we show that customers
who choose higher prices, are served with more certainty or with superior pri-
ority in equilibrium. Buyers signal about their types by choosing a service
ranking between 1 and N, where each ranking order corresponds to a purchas-
5Incentive Compatibility or Self Selection.
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ing time or markdown if the product is not sold out by then. We consider
the earlier steps as higher priority orders with more certainty in obtaining the
product. One should note that we assume that a smaller service ranking, r,
corresponds to higher probability of being served. We show that the monop-
olist serves the customers based on their service orders, i.e., the people who
have chosen higher payments are prioritized over the people who have com-
mitted to pay less6. Also, as we will discuss, the retailer may not be willing
to serve all customers. In other words, the seller might be willing to serve the
customers who declare types greater than θT , which we call as the cutoff type.
Thus, optimal number of steps could be lower than N in equilibrium.
Recall that a truthtelling strategy means that the best strategy for a
customer is to reveal her true type, vi ∈ {θ1, ..., θN}, given that everybody else
is truthful. Therefore, the following Incentive Compatibility conditions should
hold for the truthful customer i for all possible types vi = θl (where rl = r(θl)
is the corresponding truthtelling ranking choice):
E−i[gi(rl, r−i)θl− ti(rl, r−i)] ≥ E−i[gi(r̂i, r−i)θl− ti(r̂i, r−i)] ∀l, r̂i ∈ {1, ..., N},
(1.6)
or equivalently
qi(rl)θl − pi(rl) ≥ qi(r̂i)θl − pi(r̂i) ∀l, r̂i ∈ {1, ..., N}. (1.7)
6As illustrated by Myerson (1981), Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) and Ti-
role (1988) the assumption is valid under two conditions when customers are drawn in-
dependently from an identical distribution. First, the utility function be concave and
strictly increasing, and second, the hazard rate of the distribution function be increasing
in type/valuation. The former is satisfied by assuming that the customers are risk neutral,
and the latter is true for a large class of distributions, including normal, uniform, etc.
24
Furthermore, the seller can not force the buyers to participate in the
pricing scheme. Therefore, in addition to the incentive compatibility condi-
tions, the mechanism should also provide the participants with at least their
outside utility (Individual Rationality or IR condition). The outside utility is
called “outside option” or “reserve utility” and is normalized to zero:
E−i[gi(rl, r−i)θl − ti(rl, r−i)] ≥ 0 IR Condition, (1.8)
or equivalently
qi(rl)θl − pi(rl) ≥ 0. (1.9)
Before solving the monopolist’s revenue maximization problem, one
should note that the solution is be symmetric across the individuals. The
reason is that all valuations are independently and identically distributed.
Therefore, if a set of reports r′ can be obtained by rearranging r, then any
individual who reports x in the first set, r will be treated with the same
allocation and transfer rule as any individual with the same report in the set
r′. To express the symmetry in terms of equations:
gi(ri = x, r−i) = gj(r
′
j = x, r
′
−j),
ti(ri = x, r−i) = tj(r
′
j = x, r
′
−j).
The symmetry of the solution implies that expected payment and al-
location to different individuals with the same ranking should be the same,
too. Therefore, index i can be dropped from qi(.) and pi(.) in the IC and IR
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conditions (Equation 1.7 and Equation 1.9, respectively) and we denote by
q(.) and p(.) from now on.
Now, we can state the monopolist’s problem in terms of solving for the
optimal choice among the set of truthtelling allocation rules and transfers <
g(r), t(r) > - the choice that maximizes his expected revenue. In mathematical
terms, we can express the merchant’s problem as:






maximized over < g(r), t(r) >
subject to IC and IR conditions,
where Erl is the expectation over the uncertain ranking/valuation of the cus-
tomer (from the point of view of the seller), and E−i is the expectation from
the point of view of customer i with valuation vi = θl who observes the reser-
vation prices of other customers as unknown. The solution technique includes
two steps. First we ignore a number of constraints and solve the maximization
problem. Then, having solved the maximization problem and after finding
the allocation rule, we show that the ignored constraints are satisfied. The
constraints to put aside are individual rationality (IR) constraints of all types
except the lowest participating type θT , and all but one incentive compatibility
(IC) condition of every customer. The IC and IR constraints to ignore are:
E−i[gi(rl, r−i)θl − ti(rl, r−i)] ≥ 0 ∀l 6= T,
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and
E−i[gi(rl, r−i)θl − ti(rl, r−i)] ≥ E−i[gi(r̂i, r−i)θl − ti(r̂i, r−i)]
∀l, r̂i ∈ {1, ..., N} such that r̂i 6= rl−1,
which means that, for each customer with valuation θl, it is sufficient to only
consider the condition that reporting rl−1 and mimicking the closest smaller
type, θl−1, is not profitable for her. Using all the simplifying assumptions, one
could solve for the optimal set of contracts and obtain the following priority
pricing scheme:
Theorem 1.2.2. Optimal scheme is priority pricing with a cut-off rank T ,
where priority prices are {p∗T , p∗T+1, ..., p∗N}. The prices are paid upfront and
customers participate in a lottery-type sale in which their payments may not
result in the delivery of the product. Any customer with valuation θl ≥ θT
chooses the option < rl, p
∗
l > from the menu and receives the product at price
p∗l if no higher value customer is present in the market. Optimal allocation
rule, gi(ri, r−i), and cut-off rank T are defined by:
gi(r̂i, r̂−i) =

0 if ∃ j such that r̂j > r̂i
1 if @ j such that r̂j ≥ r̂i
1
K
if ∃ K number of j such that r̂j = r̂i and r̂i = maxk{r̂k},
(1.11)
where i, j, k ∈ {1, ...,M}, and T = ArgMinl {θl−(N−l)∆θl} such that {θl−
(N − l)∆θl ≥ 0}, and prices are obtained by:
p∗l = θlq(rl) +
l−1∑
j=T
(θj − θj+1)q(rj) given q(rl) = E−i[gi(rl, r−i)]. (1.12)
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Proof. Given the linearity of utility functions and the symmetry assumption
that customers are drawn independently from an identical distribution, we can
denote the expected payment of choosing ranking r by p(r) = pi(r) ∀i, which
is the same across all individuals. It simplifies our analysis since there will be
no heterogeneity among the customers, and hence, one can take expectations
of the equations without worrying about differences across individuals. There-







maximized over < g(r), {p(rk)} >
subject to q(rl)θl − p(rl) ≥ q(r̂i)θl − p(r̂i) (IC)
∀l, r̂i ∈ {1, ..., N} such that r̂i = rl−1
and q(rl)θl − p(rl) ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ {1, ..., N} (IR).
Note that prices are total expected payments and not prices contingent
on delivery. Before solving the maximization problem, one can see that if the
participation constraint for a customer with valuation θT holds, then all the
IR constraints for the others can be ignored. It is easy to show that if the IR
constraint for θl and the incentive compatibility condition for θl+1 hold, i.e.,
q(rl+1)θl+1 − p(rl+1) ≥ q(rl)θl+1 − p(rl) and q(rl)θl − p(rl) ≥ 0.
Then, since θl+1 > θl, the IR condition holds for θl+1 automatically,
i.e., q(rl+1)θl+1−p(rl+1) ≥ 0. Therefore, it is sufficient to consider only the in-
dividual rationality constraint of the lowest type, θT . Given the IR constraint
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for θT , the optimal price p
∗
T will be:
p∗T = q(rT )θT . (1.14)
One can see that the other incentive compatibility conditions should
hold with equality to maximize revenue. Therefore, price p(rl) is obtained
by iteratively plugging the price p(rl−1) in the IC condition of customer with
valuation vi = θl:
p(rl) = θlq(rl) +
l−1∑
j=T
(θj − θj+1)q(rj). (1.15)
The next step includes plugging optimal prices in Equation 1.13 and
solving the maximization problem:
Max MErl [θlq(rl) +
l−1∑
j=T
(θj − θj+1)q(rj)] (1.16)
maximized over < g(r), T > .










(θj − θj+1)q(rj)], (1.17)



















where ∆θl = θl+1−θl. The equation above implies that if valuations be equally
distanced from each other, then ∆θl will be a constant term. Therefore, the
coefficient of q(rl) - defined as ψ(θl) = θl− (N − l)∆θl - will be increasing in l.
Since the profit function is linear in the q(rl) terms, then it is optimal to make
q(rN) as big as possible. Given, q(rN), then it is optimal to make q(rN−1)
as big as possible. The allocation rule continues in the same way until the
seller stops before allocating anything to type T − 1 for whom the coefficient
of q(rT−1) becomes negative. Therefore, the allocation rule includes a priority
scheme denoted by Equation 1.11 where T is obtained from solving:
T = ArgMinl {θl − (N − l)∆θl} such that {θl − (N − l)∆θl ≥ 0}. (1.19)
In other words, a customer who chooses the option < r, p(r) >, will be
served if no other customer chooses a higher price with a higher priority. It is
interesting to study some special cases for our equilibrium:
• If you let population be too big, i.e. M →∞, then posted price will be
optimal. In other words, with big populations, seller is almost confident
that there is somebody with the highest possible valuation, and therefore,
sets a single price (known as posted price) equal to the highest possible
valuation p = 1.
• If you let N →∞, the distribution of the customer approaches a continu-
ous distribution and virtual valuation can be calculated as ψ(θl) = 2θl−1.
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The ψ(.) function is the same as virtual valuation obtained by Myerson
(1981), Wilson (1989), and Mas-Colell et al. (1995) for continuous dis-
tribution functions, i.e. θl − 1−F (θl)f(θl) , which will be equal to 2θl − 1 for a
uniform distribution in our study.
Theorem 1.2.3. Priority pricing could be implemented by offering a menu of
options with rankings and payments conditional on receiving the product. The





where p∗l and q
∗
l are equilibrium priority price and probability of being served for
customer who chooses ranking order rl specified according to Theorem 1.2.2.
Proof. The proof is very straight forward by stating that customers are risk
neutral and only care about expected utilities. Utility functions are quasilin-
ear, and therefore, one should redo the proof for Theorem 1.2.2 by using the
new utility functions after rewriting them in terms of contingent prices, p̃∗l :
q∗(rl)(θl − p̃∗l ) = q∗(rl)θl − p∗l
This theorem and the following theorem (that provides an equivalent mech-
anism to priority pricing) explain how online retailers, “pricetack.com” and
“pricefalls.com” for instance, find it optimal to implement markdown pricing
with payments conditional on the delivery of product.
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Theorem 1.2.4. When customers are risk neutral, for any priority pricing A
with a menu of options < rl, p̃
∗
l > with contingent payments, there exists an
equivalent markdown scheme, B. In mechanism B, prices fall according to the
same path, < p̃∗l >, and yield to the same total revenue.
Proof. For any option, < rl, p
∗
l >, in plan A, customer with valuation θl shall
receive the product with probability q∗l and will pay p̃
∗
l contingent on delivery.
Therefore, expected utility will be:
q∗l (θl − p∗l ).
Alternatively, the monopolist could implement a markdown scheme,
B, in which price of the product declines according to the pricing scheme




T >. In this case, prices decline every period according to a
preannounced schedule. If a customer wants to wait until a later period to
purchase the item, she will expect to pay lower but will also face higher risk
of unavailability. Initial price will be p̃∗N , and given that any customer with
type θN−1 purchases the product in period 2 at price p̃
∗
N−1, it attracts the
highest value customers, θN , to purchase the product at the initial price. This
is because all the IC and IR conditions of the customers are the same as those
in the mechanism with priority pricing.
If no customer has the valuation θN and price declines to θN−1 in the
following period, customers will update their beliefs with the information that
there is no person with valuation θN . Therefore, one could use Bayesian up-
date to find the new distribution function, fn(.), for any remaining possible
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Given the new distribution function and that any customer with val-
uation θl waits for price p̃
∗
l to purchase the product, all individuals including
the customer with valuation θN−1 will update her beliefs, and the incentive
compatibility inequalities will change accordingly. The conditions will change
only in that the new set of q∗l will be obtained by using the new distribution
function fn(.). One should note that since customers’ utilities are quasilin-
ear, all the IC conditions stay the same. Therefore, customer θN−1’s behavior
will be the same and she will choose to purchase the product at period 2, if
available. Similarly, if there were no sales in the first two periods, beliefs will
be updated correspondingly, IC conditions will stay unchanged in the same
way, and customer with valuation θN−2 will still choose to buy the product at
p̃∗N−2. The argument continues in the same way until we show that individuals
with valuation θT will choose to purchase at a price equal to their maximum
willingness to pay, p̃∗T = θT .
We complete the proof by stating that since mechanism A is optimal,
and because mechanism B leads to equivalent strategies and prices, then mark-
down pricing leads to the same optimal profit as well.
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1.2.2 Multiunit Markdowns
Theorem 1.2.5. When the seller has a total of S < M units, optimal allo-




0 if Cr̂i(r̂) ≥ S
max{1, S−Cr̂i (r̂)
K
} if Cr̂i(r̂) < S and ∃K number of j such that r̂j = r̂i,
(1.21)
where Cr̂i(r̂) is the number of people who choose a ranking order strictly higher
than r̂i, i, j ∈ {1, ...,M}, and r̂i, r̂j ∈ {1, ..., N}. Furthermore, prices are the
same as in the case with only one unit presented by Equation 1.12.
Proof. The monopolist’s maximization problem is the same as the problem in
Theorem 1.2.2 with identical incentive compatibility and individual rationality
constraints. However, the difference is that the number of available units for
sale is more than one. Therefore, the seller allocates more than one unit rather
than only one unit to the bidders. Similarly, because the maximization prob-
lem is a linear equation with bigger coefficients on the expected probability
of delivery to the higher ranked customers, the monopolist adopts a similar
priority scheme. He starts with allocating the units to the highest order cus-
tomers, rN , and charges them pN . Then, the monopolist allocates the leftover
to the customers with the next highest ranking order, rN−1 and charges them
p∗N−1. The seller continues delivering the products to the customers based on
their orders until it completely sells out. A tie-braking rule is also adopted.
When number of individuals demanding the product at the current price level
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becomes greater than the number of units left, customers are served with equal
chances. We complete the proof by stating that the price equations will remain
the same since incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints
mechanism remain the same in the new truthtelling .
However, since markdown pricing reveals information to the customers
at every step, it is not optimal to implement it in a dynamic setting. At every
single period, few items may be sold, and depending on the number of items
left, incentives of customers will be altered in the following period. Therefore,
if the seller sticks to a preannounced price schedule and reveals information
regarding the number of items left, the scheme will not be optimal for most
distributions of demand. However, there are alternatives via which seller can
obtain optimal profit. The monopolist should either hide any information
regarding the quantity sold and left or modify markdown scheme, and instead,
implement a priority pricing schedule. These arguments let us state with the
following theorem:
Theorem 1.2.6. Seller with multiple units of product should implement spe-
cific forms of markdown pricing to achieve optimal revenue. First is to hide
the number of available supply during the whole plunging process. And sec-
ond is to offer priority services in which customers choose the price level in
advance and pay conditional on receiving product.
Our analysis shows that when a seller has multiple units for sale, he
should sell them via either priority pricing scheme or hiding information re-
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garding the availability. The first mechanism is implemented in the beginning
period and before the realization of uncertainties. Higher ranked customers
receive the product with greater probabilities but at higher prices. And the
second method hides the number of remaining products at each stage so that
customers’ incentives are not distorted. This way, they do not get information
regarding the number of units sold in the previous periods and the quantity
remaining at each stage.
1.3 Risk Aversion
In this section, we assume that customers are risk averse and denote
their utility by a strictly increasing and concave function, u(x) = −e−αx,
with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The retailer is risk neutral and
cares only about the expected revenue. The utility of choosing r̂i among the
available menu of ranking orders is defined by Equation 1.3. Similar to the
solution technique in the previous section, we use the revelation principle and
search over the set of truthtelling equilibria. The maximization problem, after
ignoring the unnecessary IC and IR constraints, will be the optimal choice of
allocations and transfers, < g(r), t(r) >, to solve the following problem:
Max MErlE−i[ti(rl, r−i)] (1.22)
E−i[u(gi(rl, r−i)θl − ti(rl, r−i))] ≥ E−i[u(gi(r̂i, r−i)θl − ti(r̂i, r−i))] (IC)
E−i[u(gi(rl, r−i)θl − ti(rl, r−i))] ≥ 0 (IR)
∀l, r̂i ∈ {1, ..., N} such that r̂i = rl−1.
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The following theorem provides the optimal allocation rule in the new
framework where customers are risk averse:
Theorem 1.3.1. When customers are risk averse with CARA utility function,
u(x) = −e−αx, producer adds insurance options to the markdown scheme.
Retailer offers a menu of priority rankings and upfront payments < rl, p̄l >,
where each ranking rl is supplemented with θl = r
−1(rl) units of insurance Irl:
Irl(Cl(r);S) =

1 if S ≤ Cl(r)
1 if S > Cl(r) and gi(rl, r−i) = 0
0 if otherwise,
(1.23)
where Cl(r) is the number of people who are served before rl. Optimal allocation
rule is the same characterized by Equation 1.21 and the set of priority price,
{p̄l}, is obtained by iterative solution of the following equalities with p̄T = θT :
p̄l+1 = θl+1 − u−1(E−i[u(g(rl, r−i)∆θl + θl − p̄l)]). (1.24)
Proof. The seller is risk neutral and designs a contract to maximize total
expected profit. On the other hand, customers are risk averse. For a risk
averse buyer, an allocation that delivers a certain average utility is superior
to any original allocation that delivers an uncertain utility with the same
expected payoff. Therefore, using the specific CARA property of the utility
function, it is straightforward to show that optimal allocation requires that
the risk neutral monopolist bears the risk in equilibrium.
The mechanism allows the retailer to implement any set of money trans-
fers. Therefore, the seller who is willing to bear all or a portion of customers’
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risks, will consider offering payments to the customers in the form of insurance
contracts. We show that the ability to make insurance transfers enables the
seller to extract the maximum possible surplus from the demand side.
One unit of insurance, Irl , costs p̃rl . It provides one unit of payment
for a customer with ranking order rl when demand by higher order customers
is too high to serve him. If customer i with type θl supplements her choice,
< rl, ti(rl, r−i) >, with xi units of the corresponding insurance, < Irl , p̃rl >,
her expected utility will be:
U(rl, xi; θl) = E−i[u(gi(rl, r−i)θl − ti(rl, r−i) + Irixi − xip̃ri)]. (1.25)
Full insurance of the customer requires that:
Irl = 1− gi(rl, r−i), ti(rl, r−i) = p(rl), xi = θl, (1.26)
which means that the optimal insurance should provide θl units of insurance to
a customer with valuation θl, and should pay him when he does not receive the
product. Furthermore, the transfer function ti(rl, r−i) should be independent
of the choices of other customers. Therefore, it can be denoted by p(rl), a
function that depends only on the customer’s own choice. Therefore, the
utility function will become:
U(rl, xi = θl; θl) = u(θl − p(rl)− θlp̃rl). (1.27)
We follow the same steps as in the proof for the Theorem 1.2.2. We
combining priority price with insurance premium and denote total payment
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for choice l by p̄l = p(rl) + θlp̃rl . Considering that the lowest participating
customer, the cut-off type with valuation θT , obtains zero expected utility in
equilibrium, one can obtain p̄T = θT . Incentive compatibility conditions hold
with equality and give us equilibrium prices. Payment by type θl+1 can be
obtained by repetitive iterations of the IC conditions (starting from the IC
condition of the customer with type θT ):
u(θl+1 − p̄l+1) = E−i[u(g(rl, r−i)θl+1 + (1− g(rl, r−i))θl − p̄l)]. (1.28)
The equation above has a unique solution where p̄l+1 > p̄l. It is because
the utility function is strictly increasing and we have:
g(rl, r−i)θl+1 + (1− g(rl, r−i))θl < θl+1,
which means that the customer pays an upfront amount, receives an insur-
ance and becomes indifferent between receiving and not receiving the product.
Rewriting Equation 1.28, one can obtain:
p̄l+1 = θl+1 − u−1(E−i[u(g(rl, r−i)∆θl + θl − p̄l)]),
and the iterative solution of each price in terms of the lower price gives us:
p̄l+1 = θl+1 − u−1(E−i[u(g(rl, r−i)∆θl + u−1(E−i[u(g(rl−1, r−i)∆θl−1 + ...)]))]).
(1.29)
Assuming that the valuations are equally distanced, i.e., ∆θl = ∆ ∀l,









maximized over < g(r), T > .
According to the new maximization problem, it is sufficient to define the
allocation rule and cut-off rank to solve for the optimal scheme. Customers
have strictly increasing and concave utility functions, and therefore, inverse
utility function u−1(.) is also strictly increasing. Therefore, it becomes easy to
see that solving the maximization problem includes making g(rN , r−i) as large
as possible. Then, given g(rN , r−i), one should make make g(rN−1, r−i) as big
as possible and continue until the cut-off rank gets served by the allocation
rule, g(rT , r−i). Therefore, the optimal allocation rule will be the same as in the
case with risk neutral customers (Equation 1.21), where the seller implements
priority pricing with higher ranked customers served first. To obtain the cut-off
rank, one should note that it is not possible to provide a close form solution
and it should be obtained by computing and comparing Equation 1.30 for
different values of T .
As suggested by Equation 1.23, one unit of insurance Irl provides one
unit of payment transfers in case demand is too high to serve a customer with
ranking order rl. In other words, the insurance pays to the customer if realized
number of customers with higher ranking orders, denoted by Cl(r), become
greater than total supply S.
Therefore, customers bear no risk by transferring all the uncertainties to
the monopolist. The intuition behind the optimal equilibrium is that producer
is risk neutral and customers are risk-averse. Thus, the optimal equilibrium
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includes contracts where the seller compensates customers’ uncertainties by
insurance, and in return, gets paid higher in expected terms.
As implied by the theorems 1.3.1 and 1.2.2, the monopolist chooses
market coverage by designing a contract where no customer with valuation
lower than θT is willing to participate. By choosing the lowest service order,
he decides what portion of market to serve. An appealing operational implica-
tion is for situations when demand by the participating customers falls below
the supply level. The exceeding amount will be thrown away or unsold, and
customers with lower valuations will not be served by any kind of clearance
sales - what we call as “commodity burning”. Such experiments are seen, for
instance, in airlines’ ticket sales. United Airlines, for example, would fly with
fully occupied coach seats and empty business class seats if it turns out that
the demand for the latter is low. Or as another instance, Filene’s basement
was willing to give the remaining items to charity after a specific date if unsold
until then (Figure 1.3). In such examples, seller forgoes profit from last minute
sales. By committing to a preannounced pricing schedule, supplier extracts
more from high value customers who are incentivized to purchase the product
at higher prices.
Theorem 1.3.1 states that upfront payment schedule combined with
insurance yields to higher profit relative to pricing schemes with no insurance.
By insuring customers against losses, seller can extract more ex-ante surplus
from the market. It is because risk averse buyers pay higher in expected
terms if asked to pay in advance for a certain quality of service relative to the
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contracts where they should pay after the uncertainties are realized. Therefore,
an operational advice for producers is to bear more risk and offer insurance
schemes in order to maximize profits when customers are sensitive towards
disruptions or availability of product.
One should note that total upfront payment, p̄l, includes both insurance
premium and the price for the delivery of the product. Therefore, we can
decompose total payment into two segments: insurance premium p̃rl per unit
insured and payment for the priority service p(rl):
p̄l = p(rl) + θlp̃rl .
Insurance Irl pays off when the product is not allocated to the customer,
i.e., g(rl, r−i) = 0 or Irl = 1. In addition, expected payoff of one unit of the
insurance is equal to its premium:
p̃rl = Er−iIrl(Cl(r);S). (1.31)
Therefore, payment for the priority service can be stated as:
p(rl) = p̄l − θlp̃rl . (1.32)
In all, total upfront price can be seen as two separate payments: pay-
ment for the priority service and insurance against the risk of unavailability.
The seller’s optimal strategy is to offer contingent contracts with upfront pay-
ments and supplementary insurance in order to maximize his expected revenue.
And risk averse customers participate in a lottery-type mechanism where they
may not receive the product if demand becomes too high.
42
1.4 Conclusion
We study the revenue maximizing pricing schedule of a monopolist
in the presence of uncertain demand and against heterogeneous customers
who may differ in their valuations for the product. When customers are risk
neutral, previous studies find that the optimal mechanism consists of a single,
two, or maximum three step pricing schedule. This paper differs from the
literature by considering a more realistic structure of uncertain demand and
case where supply contains multiple units of product. In addition, it considers
the scenarios where seller commits to a pricing path in the future. In so doing,
we contribute to the literature in the following ways.
First, we are able to illustrate that the optimal policy is to price discrim-
inate via performing multistep markdown pricing or priority schemes. Mark-
down pricing is implemented when the valuations of customers are discrete,
as performed by “pricetack.com” or “pricefalls.com” websites. The pricing
schedule is preannounced in the sense that the price path is introduced in the
beginning of the horizon. On the other hand, priority scheme could be car-
ried out via an auction with simultaneous bids when supplier prefers to collect
sealed bids and allocate the products in a single period. Both falling price
schedule and priority options incentivize higher value customers to purchase
at higher prices, and therefore, enable the monopolist to extract more surplus
from market. This is because each customer must decide either to buy the
product at a higher price or at a lower price but with a certain risk. In the
“pricetack.com” case, customer may wait to purchase the item at a discounted
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rate but will face the risk of the product selling out during the sales season.
We show that when there is a single unit of supply, dynamic sales with a pre-
announced price path performs as well as the optimal mechanism in which the
seller offers menu of ranking-price options. However, we find that it is not opti-
mal to implement a scheme with plunging prices when there are multiple units
of supply unless the seller hides any information regarding the quantity sold
and quantity remaining at each period. The lower revenue of dynamic pricing,
when supply information is revealed, is due to the revelation of information to
customers. They update their strategies at every single sale period after they
observe the number of quantities sold and the amount left. Fortunately, there
are two ways seller can avoid this and achieve optimal revenue. First is to hide
number of available supply at every single period except the beginning supply
which is a common knowledge. And second is to implement a specific form of
modified priority pricing in which customers choose their desired price in the
beginning and are charged conditional on receiving the product. To implement
this, seller may receive each customer’s choice and credit card information in
the beginning, allocate the goods according to their ranking orders and charge
each one with the corresponding price if allocated the product. Finally, the
monopolist’s allocation rule is different from the efficient scheme in that “com-
modity burning” might be implemented in equilibrium. That is, if high value
customers are too few to purchase the product at the very early stages, the
monopolist may dispose of the goods rather than putting them up for sale at
very low prices.
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In addition, we show that when customers are sensitive to the availabil-
ity of product or quality of service, represented by risk averse utility functions,
there exists another pricing strategy that dominates the proposed multistep
or priority pricing schedule. In this case, monopolist is offers contingent con-
tracts, complemented by a menu of options with upfront payment and sup-
plementary insurance, and serves the customers conditional on the realization
of demand. A customer pays in advance for a product and risks loss of her
money if she does not receive the product. On the other hand, seller offers her
some reimbursement to insure her against the loss.
Future research should take into account more detailed allocation and
pricing schemes that are made feasible by recent technological innovations,
e.g., markdown pricing schemes with unknown price floor. Another direction
is the introduction of unknown aggregate population which could significantly
change the optimal pricing scheme. Furthermore, future studies need to take
into account the possibility that seller knows the distribution of potential de-
mand, but is unaware of the presence of customers in the market. For instance,
the seller may know by experience the distribution of valuations of customers,
but he might not know with certainty which customers need the product dur-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.1: Cell Phone Jammer Sold by a Falling Price Schedule on “Pric-
etack.com”
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Figure 1.2: Markdown Pricing on “Pricefalls.com”
Figure 1.3: Filene’s Basement
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Figure 1.4: Aalsmeer Flower Auction
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Chapter 2
The Finance and Growth Nexus Re-examined:
Do All Countries Benefit Equally?
A large theoretical and empirical literature has focused on the impact
of financial deepening on economic growth throughout the world. This paper
contributes to the literature by investigating whether this impact differs across
regions, income levels, and types of economy. Using a rich dataset for 150 coun-
tries for the period 19752005, dynamic panel estimation results suggest that
the beneficial effect of financial deepening on economic growth in fact displays
measurable heterogeneity; it is generally smaller in oil exporting countries; in
certain regions, such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and in
lower-income countries. Further analysis suggests that these differences might
be driven by regulatory/supervisory characteristics and related to differences
in the ability to provide widespread access to financial services.
2.1 Introduction
It is well established that a vibrant, dynamic, and well-functioning fi-
nancial sector leads to a host of improved economic outcomes. As surveyed
first by Levine (1997a), then by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2008, 2009), there
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is a vast literature showing the benefits that accrue to countries in which fi-
nancial development is greater. On the theoretical side, early work by McK-
innon (1973) and Goldsmith (1969), among others, highlighted the key role
in economic development that could be played by a banking system free of
the types of controls on interest rates and quantities that were prevalent at
the time. As the literature progressed, it began to recognize that the financial
system in generalnot exclusively banksperformed four basic functions essential
to economic development and growth: mobilization of savings, allocation of
resources to productive uses, facilitating transactions and risk management,
and exerting corporate control. Through these functions, a country providing
an environment conducive to greater financial development would have higher
growth rates, with much of the effect coming through greater productivity
rather than a higher overall rate of investment.
The empirical literature progressed in tandem, providing widespread
evidence that financial depththe extent to which an economy is making use
of bank intermediation and financial market activityis associated with higher
rates of economic growth. In order to measure financial depth, several indica-
tors have been used. For the banking sector, the ratio of liquid liabilities to
GDP, or M2 to GDP, and of private sector credit to GDP. For stock market
activity, market capitalization to GDP, the ratio of value of shares traded ei-
ther to GDP or total capitalizationboth measures of the turnover of market
activityhave also been used.
Several different econometric methodologies have been employed to un-
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cover this finance and growth nexus.1 Early studies such as King and Levine
(1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998) used a cross-country regressionthe for-
mer focusing on bank-based measures, and the latter on market-based onesand
controlled for other possible growth determinants and the Solow-Swan conver-
gence effect. To deal with potential reverse causalitythat some degree of finan-
cial development might possibly be induced by a greater demand for financial
services as economies become richersome studies have regressed growth rates
over a relatively long period on initial values of financial depth. Later stud-
ies by Levine (1998) and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) use instrumental
variable techniques to address the endogeneity issue in a panel data setting.
Finally, other studies have used dynamic panel methodologies. Beck, Levine
and Loayza (2000), Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), and Beck and Levine (2004)
rely on GMM estimators to trace the effect of financial development in markets
and banks on economic growth.
For the most part, the empirical studies on the determinants of growth
have provided a single coefficient for all countries. However, there has also
been increasing interest in examining possible sources of cross-country hetero-
geneity in these relationships. Khan and Senhadji (2000) and Khan, Senhadji
and Smith (2001) use a wide sample of countries and find heterogeneity related
to financial depth and inflation. The first paper finds threshold levels for infla-
tion in industrial and developing countries above which inflation significantly
slows growth, while the second one uncovers a threshold above which infla-
1See Levine (2004).
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tion impedes financial deepening. More recently, Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza
(2011) detect a nonlinear growth impact of banking depth, finding that it be-
comes progressively weaker as depth increases to very high levels. Eventually,
when private sector credit exceeds 110 percent of GDP, the marginal effect
of additional deepening on economic activity becomes negative, both at the
economy and industry level.
Another type of heterogeneity could arise from a finance-related re-
source curse, whereby growth underperformance by natural resource exporters
would be partly explained by financial sector underperformance. The resource
curse generally refers to negative externalities from the predominant resource-
exporting sector to the rest of the economy, operating through either the real
exchange rate channel (the Dutch Disease phenomenon), through poor fis-
cal discipline, or as a result of political economy effects that lead to weak
institutions and greater prevalence of corruption and violence.2 Two recent
studies described below go beyond these channels to examine the possible role
played by the financial sector in resource-based economies, either ameliorating
or contributing to the curse.
Nili and Rastad (2007) investigate a puzzle: the very low growth rates
experienced by oil exporters over a 30-year period even while their investment
rates are higher on average than in oil importing countries. The authors find
2For example, Klein (2010) studies a group of 23 oil-exporting countries during 19852008
and finds a significant negative impact of oil sector shocks on the non-oil sector in the
countries with high oil intensity, and attributes this relationship to factors other than the
traditional Dutch Disease channel operating through real exchange rate appreciation.
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that finance helps to explain the puzzle in two ways: oil exporters tend to
exhibit lower financial depth, and the positive impact of their financial depth
on aggregate investmentand presumably on growthis substantially weaker than
in non-oil exporting economies. Beck (2011) analyzes the case of resource-
based economies in general, exploring whether there is a financial channel to
the resource curse. He finds that, although the aggregate growth impact of
banking depth is no different for resource-based economies, both private credit
and stock market activity tend to be weaker, and access to credit for businesses
is more limited in resource-based economies. There is evidence that banks in
these countries are more profitablepossibly reflecting lower competitionbut are
not as engaged in intermediating funds to the private sector.
In this paper we explore three dimensions of possible heterogeneity in
the finance-growth nexus: across regions, between oil and non-oil exporters,
and across income levels. Our dataset encompasses the 19752005 period and
takes non-overlapping five-year averages of all variables to smooth out short-
term fluctuations in growth rates and to reduce the potential bias arising from
having a large number of time observations in dynamic panel estimation. The
sample includes up to 146 countries included in some regressions, grouped
by income level according to the IMF classification, and by oil and non-oil
exporters depending on the share of oil in total GDP, which is also included
in some regressions as the measure of oil dependence.
We find that, across regions, in Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
countries banking sector depth produces a lower growth impact than in the
54
rest of the world, while in Europe and Central Asia the impact is greater. This
provides an additional explanatory factor underlying the well-documented sub-
par growth performance of the MENA region. For example, during 19752005,
its real per capita GDP grew by an average 0.4 percent per year, compared
to 2.4 percent for Emerging and Developing Countries (EDCs) on average, 5
percent in developing Asia, 1.1 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean,
and 2.3 percent in Central and Eastern Europe (Figure 2.1). Previous studies
have examined MENA growth underperformance and have linked it to such
factors as shortfalls in institutional quality and ease of doing business, exces-
sive government consumption, and in the case of oil importers, to lack of trade
openness.3 One study, by Bhattacharya and Wolde (2010) identified the lack
of access to credit as one factor driving growth differentials between MENA
and other regions, along with a shortage of labor skills and of adequate supply
of electricity.4 However, no other study had examined systematically whether
the conventional positive link between finance and growth varies across re-
gions, thereby at least partly explaining MENAs disappointing growth per-
formance. Our results also suggest that the underperformance of the MENA
region, termed a quality gap in financial intermediation, could be related to
strong state ownership, lack of competition, and lack of progress in financial
3For example, Hakura (2004) examines MENA growth performance over 1980-2000 and
Guillaume and Rasmussen (2011) focus on the MENA oil importers during the 1990-2008
period. Both use cross-country OLS regression analysis.
4All three variables are derived from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, in which firms
are asked whether different factors are considered a major constraint to their expansion:
access to credit and/or lack of appropriate labor skills or of electricity supply.
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reform.
We also find that the growth impact of banking depth is weaker for oil
exporters in general, and is progressively weaker as the degree of oil dependence
increases. However, there is evidence that growth impact of stock market depth
may actually be higher in oil-exporting countries.
Finally, we find that, indeed, the finance-growth nexus is weaker for
Low Income Countries (LICs) as a group, and that it increases continuously
with income level. In particular, the estimated growth impact of the credit-
GDP ratio is about half as large for LICs relative to other countries with similar
depth, and appears to be actually negative at the lowest income levels, becom-
ing significantly positive at about the 73rd percentile of income per capita for
LICs in 2008. Other country characteristics appear to influence these effects
as well; as is the case for the full sample of countries, oil-exporting LICs de-
rive weaker growth from banking depth but possibly higher growth from stock
market depth. Estimations show that LICs with higher-quality supervision or
those that are more open to international trade fare relatively better than the
rest. While by no means conclusive, we also present supporting data showing
that financial access and some regulatory aspects regarding ease of entry may
be related to the identified quality gap experienced by LICs. Thus, the policy
message should be more nuanced for LICs: while greater depth in undoubtedly
desirable, the challenge is to engender high-quality deepening that facilitates
greater access, competition, and with proper supervision in place.
This effect, of course, exacerbates the fact that LICs suffer from shallow
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financial systems. For example, in 2008 the average LIC had a ratio of private
credit to GDP of just over 24 percent, compared to 47 percent for Middle
Income Countries (MICs) and 110 percent for High Income Countries (HICs).
Similarly, LICs had ratios of stock market capitalization to GDP of 23 percent,
substantially lower than the levels of 73 percent for MICs and 130 percent for
HICs in the same year. What the growth regression results imply is that
these countries may also lack the supporting legal, institutional, regulatory or
supervisory infrastructure that would allow the greatest benefit to accrue from
their existing levels of financial depth. Lack of competition and efficiency, both
in the financial and real sectors, could play a part in weakening the growth
impact as well.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 provides a
description of the data and some noteworthy stylized facts; Section 2.3 outlines
the econometric methodologies used and Section 2.4 presents the main results;
Section 2.5 concludes and offers some plausible factors that might be driving
the observed heterogeneity in the finance-growth relationship.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Datasets
The data used in this study is composed of three datasets that pro-
vide annual country-specific observations from 1975 to 2005. The measures of
financial development are provided by the Financial Structure Database con-
structed by World Bank. Standard financial depth indicators were employed:
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private credit and turnover. Private credit measures the ratio of private credit
by deposit money banks to GDP and turnover is the ratio of the value of total
shares traded to average real market capitalization.5
Some variables, such as non-oil GDP, total GDP, and population were
obtained from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) April 2010 published
database. WEO includes data from IMF staffs projections and evaluations of
economic development of all the member countries. In many cases this data
was supplemented with series obtained directly from IMF desk economists on
real non-oil GDP for oil-exporting countries.
The third database comes from the World Bank open source data. Total
real per capita GDP of countries are extracted from this dataset to calculate
the growth rate of countries as well as to use the initial levels of GDP in the
regressions to control for the convergence effect. The values are in constant
2000 US dollars. Other variables include the percentage of gross secondary
school enrollment to reflect human capital, and the ratio of FDI to GDP.
2.2.2 Stylized Facts
A list of the variables as well as their corresponding summary statistics
is available in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for the full sample of countries, in Tables 2.3
5For robustness, other financial depth indicators were also used: the ratio of bank de-
posits or liquid liabilities to GDP, and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP.
However, here we only report the regression results including private credit and turnover,
the two variables that have shown the most robust relationship with economic growth in
the literature.
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and 2.4 for the oil exporters, and in Table 2.5 for the regional and income-
level groupings. Table 2.6 displays the results of tests for differences in means
between: non-oil exporters and oil-exporters (first column), the Middle East
and North Africa and all other countries (second column), LICs and all other
countries (third column), and LICs and high-income countries (fourth column).
Finally, Table 2.7 shows the correlations among the main variables. The list of
countries is available in the Appendix, which also indicates which countries are
oil exporters, as well as the country income group and regional classification.6
Oildep measures the degree of oil dependence, and is defined as the ratio of
non-oil GDP to total GDP, both in real terms. The statistics confirm the Nili-
Rastad finding that oil exporters have shallower banking systems on average,
as measured by the ratios of deposits and private credit to GDP (Nili and
Rastad, 2007). They also have significantly lower average growth ratesof both
oil and non-oil GDPthan non-oil exporters.
The means tests also reveal that LICs are at a disadvantage in virtually
every dimension with the exception of FDI. Financial depth is significantly
lower compared to the average across all other countries, as is the level of
secondary enrollment and the growth rate.
As for cross-region differences, over the entire study period the MENA
6We generally followed the World Bank regional classification, but with one notable
exception: GCC countries, which are classified by the World Bank in the high-income
non-OECD category, are classified here together with the low and middle-income MENA
countries. In this manner, the MENA category encompasses all countries in the region, both
GCC and non-GCC.
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region does not exhibit lower levels of secondary enrollment or FDI compared
to other regionsthe p-values of the tests of differences in means are all well
above 10 percenthowever, its growth performance has been significantly weaker
(Figure 2.1). Moreover, the MENA countries on average do not appear to be
particularly lacking in financial depth; average levels of bank deposits, private
sector credit, or stock market turnover are not significantly different from those
in the rest of the world. In fact, in 2008 the average private credit-GDP ratio
for the region was, at 45 percent, higher than the emerging economy average
of 38 percent, although well short of the 118 percent level typically observed in
high-income countries (Figure 2.2a). Stock markets in MENA countries also
appear to be relatively deep, with a turnover ratio of just under 40 percent
in comparison to a world average of 54 percent and an EDC average of 40
percent.
However, three main qualifications should be made. First, there is con-
siderable heterogeneity within the Middle East and North Africa. One way
to see this is by slicing this region further, into a Mediterranean Associated
Countries, or MEDA subregion, and the rest, which are primarily oil-exporting
economies and several of which are also in the high-income GCC grouping.7
While the two subregions exhibit very similar levels of private credit, the
7The MEDA group is comprised of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco,
Syria, Tunisia, and the West Bank and Gaza, while the rest of the region, or non-MEDA
includes the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates), as well Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, Mauritania, and Sudan. Note that, due to data
limitations, not all of the countries listed here will be included the regressions. Another
subdivision used is between the six GCC and the remaining, non-GCC countries.
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MEDA group is visibly lagging in stock market depth, with a turnover of
about half than that observed in the rest of the MENA region. On a coun-
try by country level, Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and the
United Arab Emirates exhibit markedly deeper banking systems, with depth
well above 50 percent of GDP, while others, such as Algeria, Libya and Syria,
register depth below 15 percent of GDP (Figure 2.2b). With regard to equity
markets, some GCC countries stand out as having a high level of activityin
particular, Saudi Arabia, with a turnover ratio of more than 130 percentwhile
Jordan, Egypt and Morocco are at about 30 percent, with the rest of the
countries well below the EDC average.
The second qualification is that trends in bank deepening over time are
not very encouraging for a number of MENA countries. Although the region
on average deepened substantially from 1970 to 2008, the MEDA subregion
stalled noticeably after 2005, losing about three percentage points of GDP. At
the same time, other regions such as Europe and Central Asia were able to
gain ground much more rapidly, gaining close to 20 percentage points of GDP
(Figure 2.3). Although banking systems in other regions may have engaged in
unsustainably high rates of bank lending in the run-up to the global financial
crisis, the downward movement in MEDA should be cause for some concern, at
the very least to merit further study to identify factors underlying this credit
slowdown.
Third, MENA countries rank lowest in terms of converting bank de-
posits into private sector credit. For the average MENA banking system in
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2008, credit represented 69 percent of bank deposits, as opposed to 90 percent
for the average EDC (Figure 2.4). In particular, the bulk of the MEDA coun-
tries fall short; on average only about half of bank deposits were converted
into loans to the private sector in 2008. Furthermore, over three decades the
ratio has fallen more rapidly in the MEDA countries than anywhere else, and
has continued to fall over the past decade, while beginning to recover in other
regions (Figure 2.4). Thus, in these countries there is substantial untapped
potential in the form of deposits that could be channeled into productive ac-
tivities.
2.3 Empirical Methodology
The empirical objective is to obtain efficient, unbiased, and consistent
estimates of the effect of financial development on growth. The general regres-
sion model used in most studies, as well as in this paper, can be summarized
as:
git = α + βfit + γXit + δyi,t−1 + ci + µt + εit, (2.1)
where yi,t is the GDP per capita of country i in period t and git is the growth
rate of GDP per capita in the same period. The focus of the studies is on
estimating β which indicates the effect of financial development, denoted by
fi, on growth. The convergence effect is denoted by δ, as lagged income,
yi,t−1(or initial income yi,t0 in some cases) is expected to have a negative effect
on growth rate. Xit is the set of control variables: as in Beck and Levine (2004),
these include FDI and gross secondary school enrollment. Furthermore, the
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specification includes ci, denoting unobserved country-specific time-invariant
variable, and µt, the time dummy variable in period t to capture common
shocks affecting all countries simultaneously. Finally, εit is the error term, a
white noise error with mean zero.
This paper focuses on the GMM dynamic panel methodology to present
econometric estimates of β, given that the OLS estimator suffers from two
deficiencies. First, because of (unobserved) omitted variables that may be
correlated with the included covariates and drive economic growth at the same
time, OLS estimates might be biased. This arises from the possible correlation
of the lagged or initial value of the dependent variable with the error term,
i.e., E[yi,t−1(ci + εit)] 6= 0 or E[yio(ci + εit)] 6= 0, depending on which version
of initial income is used in the regression. Second, the OLS method does
not control for other sources of endogeneity such as reverse causality. Some
instrumental variable estimations, such those in La Porta et al. (1998) use legal
origin dummies as instruments for financial depth, but these require OLS to
be applied purely at the cross-section level.
If one wishes to take advantage of time variation in the data and adopts
the plausible assumption that the explanatory variables in the regression are
weakly exogenousthey are affected only by the present and past levels of eco-
nomic growth and uncorrelated with future innovations in growththen the
GMM dynamic panel methodology proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998) provides unbiased estimators for the coeffi-
cients of interest. The method combines a regression in levels and a regression
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in differences. One must be careful to apply it to cases in which the num-
ber of periods is small relative to the number of cross-sectional observations,
otherwise asymptotic imprecision and biases may arise.8 For this reason, and
to smooth out cyclical variations in growth, this method is applied to non-
overlapping five-year averages of the variables. Using 25 years of observations
for 150 countries, the averaging produces five 5-year periods for each country,
thus the number of time observations is very small relative to the number of
countries.
By first-differencing Equation 2.1 we obtain the following equation
which eliminates country-specific variables, thus avoiding the potential omit-
ted variable bias caused by time-invariant heterogeneity:
∆git = β∆fit + γ∆Xit + δ∆yi,t−1 + ∆µt + ∆εit, (2.2)
where ∆rit = rit − ri,t−1 for a given variable r. Although this differenced
equation eliminates unobserved country-specific variables, it introduces a new
correlation between the difference of lagged values of initial income and the
error term (because of the correlation between εi,t−1 in the differenced error
term and the covariates). Using the weak exogeneity assumption, Arellano
and Bond (1991) propose that lagged values of the weakly exogenous (prede-
termined) and exogenous variables be used as instruments to the differenced
8As noted by Roodman (2009a), a rule of thumb for avoiding over-identification of in-




E[fi,t−s∆εit] = E[fi,t−s∆εit] = E[fi,t−s∆εit] = 0
∀t ≥ 3, s ≥ 2 for weakly exogenous and s ≥ 1 for exogenous variables.
Furthermore, the Arellano and Bover method employs additional mo-
ments to be used in the GMM estimation. These are obtained from the equa-
tion for regression in levels, Equation 2.1, using the intuition that lagged dif-
ferences of the covariates are valid instruments for the regression in levels and
are uncorrelated with the error term under the assumption that the correla-
tions between the country specific term, ci, and the covariates are constant
over time. For example, the lagged difference of financial development, the
control variables, and lagged income, are uncorrelated with the error term and
the fixed effects in Equation 2.1, i.e.:
E[∆fi,t−s(ci+εit)] = E[∆Xi,t−s(ci+εit)] = E[∆yi,t−s(ci+εit)] = 0 ∀t ≥ 3, s = 2.
Stacking all the moment conditions from the difference and level equa-
tions, a two-step GMM estimation is performed. In the first stage, it is as-
sumed that the errors are homoskedastic and independent. The second stage
takes the estimates of the variance-covariance matrix and performs a similar
estimation to obtain final estimates under the assumption that the error terms
are not necessarily homoskedastic and independent.9
9We use the xtabond2 command in STATA. Option h(2) is used in all regressions to
control for the heteroskedasticity of the errors in the estimation of the variance-covariance
matrix. Also, two lags of the covariates are used in all regressions to construct internal
instrumental variables. Finally, standard errors are clustered at the country level by use of
the robust option with xtabond2, as explained by Roodman (2009b).
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The empirical model in this paper extends the conventional finance-
growth equation to include an interaction term (Interact) between financial
depth and one of three alternatives: (i) dummy variables to capture regional
effects: Europe and Central Asia, MENA (or, alternatively, with MEDA or
GCC subgroupings), South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa,
Latin America and the Caribbean, and the rest of the world (high-income
countries);10 (ii) a dummy variable for oil exporters, Oilexp, as in Nili and
Rastad (2007); and (iii) the degree of oil dependence, Oildep, measured as the
share of hydrocarbons in total GDP. In contrast to Oilexp, this variable varies
over time as well as across countries:
git = α + βfit + κ Interacti × fit + γXit + δyi,t−1 + ci + µt + εit. (2.3)
We use a similar set of control variables Xi as in Beck and Levine (2004):
secondary school enrollment (education) to control for the effect of the level
of human capital, and FDI as a percentage of GDP. 11 All X variables are
computed as the logarithm of their mean values over each five year period. κ
measures the possible heterogeneity across groups of countries in the effect of
financial development on economic growth. Finally, regressions are run with
10These dummy variables are defined according to the World Bank regional classifications
for low- and middle-income countries, with one exception: the six countries of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates) are classified here as MENA countries, whereas the World Bank classifies them
as high-income countries.
11Here we report only the specifications including private credit as the banking depth
variable and stock market turnover as the market depth variable. The main results of other
specifications are essentially the same, and are available from the authors upon request.
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either total real GDP per capita or real non-oil GDP per capita as dependent
variables.
The present paper introduces the following methodological and data
improvements over previous studies: (i) in contrast to the Becks (2011) analy-
sis of resource-rich economies, it uses a dynamic panel method (as in Nili and
Rastad, 2007) rather than cross-country regressions to uncover differences for
oil exporters; (ii) in contrast to the Nili and Rastad study of oil exporters, it
uses a longer and more updated sample (19752005 vs. 19922001) and takes
non-overlapping five-year averages of all variables, rather than annual observa-
tions; (iii) also in contrast to Nili and Rastad, it includes a more comprehensive
country sample, with up to 146 countries included in some regressions. In par-
ticular, the sample of oil exporters has been expanded,12 and they are captured
in the regressions not only through a dummy variable, but also in terms of a
continuous variable measuring the degree of dependence on oil (as in Becks
measures of resource dependence); (iv) in contrast to both of the above studies,
it runs regressions for non-oil GDP in addition to total GDP growth. As eco-
nomic diversification is a major issue for oil-dependent economies, the impact
finance has on the long-run performance of the non-oil sector is of paramount
importance; and (v) also in contrast to both studies, it not only examines the
impact of the banking sector, but also that of stock market activity.
12Nili and Rastad (2007) include only twelve countries as oil exporters. This paper ex-
pands the sample to include 30 oil exporters, some of which Nili and Rastad had incorrectly




The results of the system GMM estimator for the relationship between
banking sector depthas measured by the private credit-GDP ratioand growth
are shown in Tables 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10. Specifically, we examine heterogeneity
in this relationship across regions (Table 2.8), between oil exporters and other
countries (Table 2.9), and across income levels (Table 2.10). In the first two
cases, we run regressions for growth in non-oil as well as total per capita real
GDP. In Table 2.8, the first and fifth columns present the baseline specification
commonly used in the literature (such as in Beck and Levine (2004) or Beck
(2008)), with one key modification: we also account for the possible effect
of financial crises on the finance-growth relationship. As shown by Rousseau
and Wachtel (2011), the empirical link between finance and growth weakens
considerably once post-1990 data are introduced, primarily as a result of the
proliferation of financial crises and their adverse effects on economic activity.
Indeed, using the Laeven and Valencia (2012) definition of systemic banking
crises, about 60 percent of all such episodes experienced during the 19702007
period occurred in the 1990s. Furthermore, to the extent that the incidence
of crises varies across countries, accounting for these episodes is also crucial to
disentangle cross-country differences in the growth impact of financial deep-
ening.13 Across all specifications, financial crises reduce the growth impact of
13The Middle East and North African countries have had a particularly low incidence of
these episodes: over the 19702010 period, systemic banking crises arose about 13 percent
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private credit by about one-half.
The second and sixth columns in Table 2.8 report the previous results
interacting private credit with the region dummy variables,14 showing that the
growth effects are lower for the MENA region, as well as for Latin America and
the Caribbean. With regard to total GDP growth, the results indicate that
the same level of banking depth in the MENA region produces growth effects
that are about one-third smaller than in other regions. When non-oil growth is
considered, the MENA region appears to fare even worse, with a growth impact
about one-half that of the rest of the world. In addition, there is evidence
that Europe and Central Asia obtain relatively greater growth benefits benefit
from private credit. Note that, by controlling for financial crises, the estimated
heterogeneity refers to growth effects across regions during normal times.
Owing to the aforementioned heterogeneity within MENA, columns
(3), (4), (7), and (8) introduce regional dummies once again, but distinguish
further within MENA, following two alternative subgroupings: Mediterranean-
Associated countries vs. the rest; and GCC vs. the rest. The results suggest
that the GCC countries behave similarly to high-income countries;15 the co-
of the time, compared to 23 percent on average for emerging and developing economies.
Furthermore, during 200010, while this frequency spiked at 60 percent for OECD countries,
the MENA region managed to avoid these episodes altogether.
14Since the regional classification is applied to emerging and developing countries only,
the null hypothesis being tested is that the coefficient on private credit in each region is
equal to that in high-income countries. Therefore, significance of the coefficient of a given
dummy variable indicates that, in the corresponding region, the growth impact of private
credit is significantly different from that in a high-income country.
15Recall that in the conventional classification, the GCC countries are in fact classified as
high-income countries.
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efficient on the interaction term between private credit and the GCC dummy
is not statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore, when the
GCC countries are combined with a set of non-Mediterranean countries, the
results are similar; the MEDA interaction coefficient with private credit is neg-
ative and significant, whereas the corresponding coefficient for other MENA
countries is not statistically significant.16 Finally, once the GCC countries
are accounted for separately, the interaction term for the Latin America and
Caribbean region no longer becomes significant. That is, this region behaves
relatively similarly to the full set of high-income countries.
In the lower portion of Tables 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10, we report results of the
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation and the Hansen test for over-identifying
restrictions. The existence of autocorrelation would indicate that lags of the
covariates used as instruments are actually endogenous, and therefore, not
good instruments for the regressions. The test for autocorrelation, essentially
an AR(2) test,17 yields no evidence of significant autocorrelation among the set
of instruments. The Hansen test checks the correlation between the residuals
and exogenous variables to assess the validity of instruments.18 The results
16A similar, and somewhat stronger, result occurs when distinguishing between the GCC
and all non-GCC countries in the region, that is, MEDA plus Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Yemen.
The interaction coefficient for the GCC is not significant, while that of the non-GCC is
negative and highly significant.
17The test is applied to the differenced residuals. As expected, we observe first degree
correlation in differences, AR(1), for all the regressions. This is because by construction
∆εit = εit − εi,t−1 should be correlated with ∆εi,t−1 = εi,t−1 − εi,t−2, as both include the
εi,t−1 term. To test for correlation between εi,t−1 and εi,t−2, we should check for the second
degree correlation, AR(2), in differences - since the former error term appears only in ∆εit
and the latter is present in ∆εi,t−2.
18Since the number of moment conditions is greater than the number of parameters to
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for our regressions indicate that the null hypothesis that the instruments are
exogenous cannot be rejected.
In quantitative terms, the estimation results imply that the differences
in growth potential across regions are not only statistically significant, but
economically meaningful as well. Figure 2.5 shows the estimated impact on
long-term total GDP growth from increasing banking sector depth. As one
would expect from a log specification, greater growth benefits accrue to coun-
tries that begin their deepening from a lower initial level. In Figure 2.5a,
countries are shown in which the current ratio of private credit to GDP is
below the EDC, and therefore the figure depicts the estimated increase in
growth rate obtained if each country were to reach the EDC average. Rela-
tive to countries outside the region, MENA countries would obtain a smaller
increase in growth, with the difference amounting to a quality effect of their
financial depth. For example, if Algeria were to increase its current depth from
an initial level of 10 percent to the EDC average of 29 percent, its growth rate
is estimated to increase by 112 basis points. However, a non-MENA country
starting from the same initial depth could expect to increase its growth rate
by 163 basis points, thus resulting in a quality effect of 51 basis points. Several
non-MENA countries are shown for comparison purposes. For example, Arme-
nia, which would obtain a full benefit of 160 basis points if it were to reach the
EDC average depth. Figure 2.5a shows a group of MENA countries with ini-
be estimated, the model is over-identified. Therefore, the test checks for the joint validity
of all instruments, Z, under the null, and evaluates E[Zεit] to examines if it is randomly
distributed around zero.
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tial depth above the EDC average, therefore the figure displays the gains that
would result from increasing depth by 20 percentage points of GDP, roughly
the increase observed in high-income countries from 1995 to 2005. As before,
for each MENA country there is the predicted effect and that which would
accrue to a non-MENA country, with the difference corresponding to a quality
effect.
Table 2.9 presents the results of regressions which distinguish oil ex-
porters from the rest, confirming the Nili and Rastad finding that oil depen-
dency weakens the finance-growth link, and thus providing evidence of a fi-
nance channel for the resource-curse. Oil exporters as a group obtain a smaller
benefit from financial deepening, and the benefits fall continuously with the
degree of oil dependence. Interestingly, both interaction terms are larger in
absolute values in the regressions for non-oil GDP growth, thus indicating
that banks in these countries have been particularly ineffective in generat-
ing productive activity outside the oil sector. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8)
present further interactions of private credit and Oilexp and Oildep with the
GCC dummy. The results indicate that the GCC countries would tend to
fare better in comparison to similarly oil-dependent countries outside the re-
gion. For example, Saudi Arabiawith an oil dependence of about 33 percent
in 2005would obtain a greater growth benefit from private credit than would
a similarly oil-dependent country, such as Trinidad and Tobago. This result
is consistent with the previous result that the growth benefits from banking
depth in GCC countries are similar to those in high-income countries. As a
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quantitative example, consider Nigeria (an African oil exporter), with average
ratio of oil GDP to total GDP equal to 42% over the 2000-2005 period. The
differential impact of financial depth on non-oil growth in this country for a
10% increase in private credit relative to that in a non-oil exporter will be
equal to 0.044× 42%× 10% = 18.5basispoints.
In Table 2.10 we summarize the findings on heterogeneity across income
levels. There is evidence that LICs as a group obtain lower growth benefits
from the same level of private credit, and that these benefits increase contin-
uously with income level. Differentiating further, it is apparent that banking
systems are more conducive to long-term growth in LICs which are more open
to tradeas measured by the ratio of exports and imports to GDP19and where
bank supervision is of higher quality20. In addition, these two characteristics
only appear to affect the growth benefits of private credit in LICs, as the
interaction terms for non-LICs are not statistically significant.
In Figures 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 we show the magnitudes of the above effects;
how the growth impacts of banking depth vary across income levels and with
respect to openness and the quality of bank supervision. In Figure 2.6 we see
that at very low income levels the growth impact is not statistically significant,
19We also tested for heterogeneity across income levels using the liquid liabilities-GDP
and the deposits-GDP ratios. Although most results were similar, a significant mitigating
effect of openness only arose in the case of private credit-GDP.
20The banking supervision variable is obtained from Abiad et al. (2010), and, as men-
tioned above, is scaled from 1 to 3. Its level depends on the degree to which the country
has adopted risk-based capital adequacy ratios based on the Basel I Accord; the supervisor
is independent from the executive and has sufficient legal powers; supervision covers a wide
range of institutions; and on- and offsite examinations of banks are effective.
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and only becomes positive (at a 95 percent confidence level) at a per capita
income of $810, or roughly the 73rd percentile for LICs in 200821. Figure
2.7 illustrates the mitigating effect of the quality of bank supervision; at low
levels, LICs are at a clear disadvantage, but as this quality improves, the
growth impact LICs begins to approximate that of middle and high-income
countries. As of 2005, the average value of the bank supervision indicator for
a sample of 18 LICs s indicator was 1.4, compared to 1.8 for middle-income
countries and over 2.5 for high-income countries. Finally, in Figure 2.8 we
show how the lower growth impact of private credit in LICs is mitigated by
the degree of trade openness of these countries. LIC banking performance
begins to approximate that of other countries once total trade approaches 56
percent of GDP, or at the 47th percentile for LICs in 2008.
2.4.2 Stock Market Activity
Tables 2.11, 2.12, and 2.13 repeat the same exercises as in Tables 2.8,
2.9, and 2.10, respectively, including a stock market-based, Turnover,22 rather
than a bank-based measure of financial development as the relevant explana-
tory variable. As in the case of private credit, we account for banking crises
21Note that this figure expresses the horizontal axis in log form (as estimated in the regres-
sions), and therefore an exponential transformation is required to translate the thresholds
from the plot into income levels. Also, the levels at which the marginal growth impact of
financial depth becomes nonnegative and positive are evaluated using the 95 percent confi-
dence bands as shown. These confidence bands were constructed using the Fieller method,
as described in Hirschberg and Lye (2010).
22As in the case with banking sector depth, we ran alternative regressions (not reported
here) using the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP as the relevant market depth
variable. The results are consistent with those using stock market turnover.
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and find that the coefficient on stock market turnover is positive and signif-
icant in normal times, while crises have a significant negative impact on the
coefficient. However, virtually none of the cross-region heterogeneity observed
for banks is present in the regressions for stock market activity, aside from
weak evidence of a slightly larger growth impact in Europe and Central Asia
(Table 2.11). Thus, it appears that greater deepening should be expected
to generate roughly the same benefits across. The same can be said for oil
exporters; neither the interaction with the oil exporter dummy nor with the
degree of oil dependence yield significant coefficients, although there is weak
evidence that oil exporters outside of the GCC might derive greater growth
benefits from stock market activity (Table 2.12, fourth column). Regarding
differences across income levels, there is also evidence that LICs obtain less
growth benefits from stock market activity, an effect which is mitigated by a
having higher quality bank supervision (Table 2.13, fifth column).
Figure 2.9 shows the magnitude of the potential gains across all regions
from increasing stock market turnover by 20 percentage points, approximately
equivalent to the deepening experienced by EDCs on average from 1995 to
2008. Starting at 10 percent, the gains are close to one-half of a percentage
point, and decline to about one-fifth of a percentage point for countries starting
at a turnover ratio of 30 percent.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
The positive impact of financial development on growth has been a
robust empirical result in the literature for some time now. Different econo-
metric methodologies have been developed by researchers to obtain unbiased
estimates of the effect of finance on growth. This paper employs a commonly-
used GMM dynamic panel methodology to investigate whether the strength
of the estimated effect varies across countries.
We find that the finance-growth nexus is indeed heterogeneous across
regions, income levels and between oil and non-oil exporters, and this hetero-
geneity arises primarily for the level of banking depth rather than for stock
market activity. These general results thus give rise to another question: what
specific factors drive this heterogeneity? What characteristics of banking sys-
tems might explain why some groups of countries derive greater growth benefits
from the same level of activity?
Although by no means definitive, one possibility is that differences in
access to financial services and in the degree of banking competitionwhich are
not perfectly correlated with banking depthmight help to explain the hetero-
geneity. Figure 2.10 shows the performance of MENA countries relative to the
EDC average and to sub-Saharan Africa, along the following dimensions: (i)
banking depth, measured by private credit-GDP, (ii) use of banking services,
measured by the number of bank depositors and borrowers as a share of the
adult population; (iii) banking competition, measured by the H-statistic, esti-
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mated on an individual country basis by Anzoategui et al. (2010);23 and (iv)
access to banking services as reflected in enterprise surveys which ask whether
firms perceive lack of financing to be a major impediment to firm growth; and
(v) access measured by the percentage of surveyed firms that are receiving
bank financing.
The main message to draw from these comparisons is that in MENA
countries the overall volume of bank creditused in this paper as the basic
measure of banking sector depthis not matched by performance in providing
access to a broad segment of households and firms, or in terms of competition
or efficiency of the banking system. Therefore, it seems plausible that the
quality gap observed from the regression results is related to deficiencies in
providing access and generating competition. As discussed earlier, the average
MENA country mobilizes a larger volume of private sector credit than does
the average EDC, about 30 percent greater. However, outreach of banking
services to the population is visibly inferior, about 2030 percent lower, while
the proportion of firms citing credit as a constraint is 10 percent higher, and
the percentage of firms receiving bank financing is only four fifths of that in
the average EDC. Furthermore, estimated competition in the banking system
is 20 percent lower24.
23The H-Statistic is an estimate of the responsiveness of bank output prices to changes
in input prices. The closer the indicator is to unity, the more the price behavior resembles
that of a perfectly competitive market, and therefore a higher level is interpreted as that of
a more competitive market. See Anzoategui et al. (2010) for details.
24Anzoategui et al. (2010) find that the difference in banking competition between the
MENA and other regions is statistically significant.
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The relative performance of MENA countries with respect to the most
financially underdeveloped region, sub-Saharan Africa, is also illuminating.
Despite the fact that MENA depth is over 2? times the average in sub-Saharan
Africa, outreach to borrowers is only twice as large, the share of firms indicating
credit as a major constraint only 20 percent lower, and the percentage of
surveyed firms receiving bank credit only 20 percent greater. Furthermore,
average estimated competition in the banking system is virtually identical.
With this backdrop, the regression results show that MENA countries
suffer from what is termed a quality gap in banking intermediation; for the
same level of depth, the growth benefits are at most two-thirds of those ob-
tained in other regions. As the regression results showed, this gap appears to
be more pronounced for the non-GCC countries.
The finance-growth nexus tells us a similar story about LICs, with the
added complication that they suffer from shallow financial systems as well.
In fact, the differences in access to financial services between LICs and other
countries are strikingly larger than the respective differences in depth. For
example, while in 2008 banking depth in the average high-income country was
4? times the level of the average LIC, access to bank branches and ATMs
was over 50 times as great, the coverage of banking services (deposits and
loans) among the population was about 7 times as great, and that of non-
bank institutions was 69 times as great (Figure 2.11).
Figure 2.12 summarizes the simple relationship between financial ac-
cess, use of financial services, and financial depth, comparing across LICs vs.
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non-LICs, oil exporters vs. others, and MENA vs. other regions. While there
is a visible positive cross-country relationship between depth and access, it is
noticeable that the three groups that were identified as having subpar growth
benefits from depth also tend to underperform in terms of access. For the same
level of depth, LICs, those in the MENA region, and oil dependent economies
have considerably fewer borrowers from commercial banks and fewer branches
relative to other countries.
Differences in bank ownership may also play a role. As Figure 2.13
shows, many countries in the MENA region are characterized by a relatively
high share of state banks and/or a relatively small share of foreign-owned
banks. However, there is also considerable heterogeneity within this group of
countries. On one extreme, Algeria, Libya and Syria have a dominant role
played by state banksin 2008, the asset shares approached 100 percent in the
first two, and about 70 percent in the latterand essentially no entry of for-
eign banks. At the other extreme, Lebanon and Jordan have zero state bank
participation, while having permitted substantial foreign bank penetration.
The remaining countries lie somewhere in between, with state bank participa-
tion that is high by international standardsbetween 37 and 57 percent market
share in 2008and with modest foreign bank participation, below international
averages.
What are the consequences of having relatively high state bank par-
ticipation and low foreign bank participation? Regarding state banks, their
strong presence has often been cited as a factor limiting financial develop-
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ment, yet the question of whether they exert an independent negative impact
on growthfor example, via a lower quality of bank intermediationis not clear-
cut. However, a recent study by Korner and Schnabel (2010) identified two
factors that combine to produce significant negative growth effects from state
ownership of banks: low levels of financial depth and low institutional qual-
ity25. Within the country sample analyzed, several MENA countriesBahrain,
Egypt, Kuwait, and Syriafell in the group for which state ownership was likely
to undermine growth. Furthermore, there is country-level evidence of ineffi-
ciency and corruption in lending by state-owned banks. For example, Khwaja
and Mian (2005) document the preferential treatment given exclusively by
state-owned banks to politically connected firms in Pakistan, amounting to
a distribution of political rents which cost the aggregate economy up to an
estimated 1.9 percent of GDP per year. Foreign bank presence, on the other
hand, has often been linked to improvements in banking sector performance
and competition, thus suggesting potential benefits that could accrue from
allowing greater openness to these institutions.
Of course, the weaker link between finance and economic growth in
certain groups of countries could also be due to weakness on the demand side
of the credit market, that is, to a lack of profitable investment opportunities. In
the case of oil exporters, it is certainly plausible that, due to Dutch Disease-
type effects, non-oil sectors are simply not competitive and therefore yield
25This study analyzed the impact of state banks on economic growth during 1970-2007.
The institutional variables considered were: democracy, political rights, bureaucracy quality,
and corruption control.
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lower returns than their counterparts in the rest of the world. Our regression
results with non-oil growth as the dependent variable would be consistent
with this interpretation. However, it is not clear why other, non-oil exporting
MENA countries or LICs would have systematically lower returns on bank-
financed investments, as our results would imply. Finally, if the source of
weakness is on the demand side, then it is not clear why the weaker finance-
growth nexus does not extend to stock markets as well. Therefore, our reading
of the results is that it is primarily conditions on the supply sidethe functioning
of banks and their regulatory environmentthat are driving the weaker growth
outcomes in MENA, oil exporters, and LICs.
Thus, policymakers in these countries are faced with a complex chal-
lenge. In addition to establishing and consolidating macroeconomic stability,
and continuing with financial reform, both of which will provide the basis for
greater financial deepening both in banking and stock markets, efforts must be
made on two additional fronts. First, impediments to credit expansion must
be reduced, especially in MENA countries, to increase the amount of credit
per unit of deposits. The most likely suspects are fiscal dominance or overly
restrictive monetary policy, both of which might be diverting bank funds away
from financing the private sector. Second, policymakers should also pursue
actions that enhance the quality of bank intermediationpossibly including a
reassessment of the role of state bankswhich should lead to improvements in
access and greater competition. As discussed extensively and convincingly in
the recent World Bank flagship report on finance in the MENA region (World
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Bank, 2011), introducing improvements in information on prospective borrow-
ersincluding the establishment of credit bureaus enhancing the legal protection
of creditor rights as well as the framework surrounding secured transactions,
are all potential areas where quality gains can be achieved. For LICs, im-
provements in bank supervision should be pursued as well. Ultimately, these
actions should result in benefits in terms of higher and more sustainable long-
run growth.
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2.6 Appendix: Country List by Region (150 countries)
(Oil dependent and low income countries are marked by * and ◦, respectively)
East Asia & Pacific
Cambodia◦ Mongolia◦ Thailand
Fiji Papua New Guinea*◦ Tonga◦
Indonesia* Philippines Vanuatu◦
Lao PDR◦ Samoa◦ Vietnam◦
Malaysia* Solomon Islands◦






Latin America & Caribbean
Argentina Ecuador* Panama
Belize El Salvador Paraguay
Bolivia*◦ Grenada◦ Peru
Brazil Guatemala St. Kitts and Nevis
Chile Guyana◦ St. Lucia◦
Colombia Haiti◦ St. Vincent & Grenadines◦
Costa Rica Honduras◦ Uruguay
Dominica Jamaica Venezuela, RB*
Dominican Republic◦ Mexico*
Middle East & North Africa
Algeria* Lebanon Sudan*◦
Bahrain* Libya* Syrian Arab Republic*
Egypt, Arab Rep.* Morocco Tunisia*











Burkina Faso◦ Kenya◦ Senegal◦
Burundi◦ Lesotho◦ South Africa
Cameroon*◦ Madagascar◦ Swaziland
Cape Verde◦ Malawi◦ Tanzania◦
Central African Republic◦ Mali◦ Togo◦
Chad*◦ Mauritania◦ Uganda◦
Congo, Republic of*◦ Mauritius Zambia◦
Cote d’Ivoire◦ Mozambique◦ Zimbabwe
Ethiopia◦ Namibia
High-Income Countries
Bahamas, The Germany Norway*
Barbados Greece Poland
Belgium Hungary Portugal




Czech Republic Japan Switzerland
Denmark Korea, Rep. Trinidad and Tobago*
Equatorial Guinea* Latvia United Kingdom
Estonia Malta United States
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Number of Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Private Credit 673 35.951 31.042 0.456 191.697
Bank Deposits 668 38.352 29.249 1.828 216.983
Liquid Liabilities 655 44.22 28.497 5.212 227.672
Market Cap 357 32.217 38.473 0.038 232.213
Turnover 361 33.487 41.633 0.144 294.096
Growth 696 1.737 2.852 -9.838 9.998
Non-Oil Growth 645 1.749 2.923 -10.929 9.86
Education 671 61.825 32.998 2.499 158.453
FDI 696 2.48 3.46 -3.623 33.54
Oil 652 0.04 0.121 0 0.78
Lerner Index 315 0.242 0.096 -0.034 0.501
H-Stat 309 0.653 0.185 0.174 1.035
Table 2.2: Cross-Country Summary Statistics
Number of Countries Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Private Credit 146 33.753 26.735 2.857 148.269
Bank Deposits 144 36.713 26.439 4.595 173.864
Liquid Liabilities 142 42.783 26.072 9.591 182.613
Market Cap 105 29.916 33.343 0.547 156.721
Turnover 104 29.761 29.526 0.742 139.587
Growth 150 1.894 1.673 -1.769 7.997
Non-Oil Growth 147 1.886 1.842 -3.747 7.997
Education 150 62.544 31.308 5.638 115.638
FDI 150 2.835 2.817 0.06 16.406
Oil 147 0.056 0.144 0 0.757
Lerner Index 70 0.249 0.096 -0.034 0.501
H-Stat 69 0.635 0.185 0.174 1.035
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics - Oil Exporters
Number of Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Private Credit 136 26.347 21.558 2.004 136.846
Bank Deposits 131 30.526 22.08 2.08 115.104
Liquid Liabilities 132 39.024 23.869 5.212 123.68
Market Cap 70 31.157 41.278 0.038 198.713
Turnover 70 21.639 23.446 0.144 100.875
Growth 137 1.28 3.144 -9.838 9.998
Non-Oil Growth 97 1.153 3.735 -10.929 9.847
Education 131 55.128 26.991 6.043 117.992
FDI 137 2.496 3.537 -3.073 28.225
Oil 104 0.25 0.197 0 0.78
Lerner Index 88 0.301 0.113 0.063 0.501
H-Stat 88 0.643 0.161 0.299 0.991
Table 2.4: Cross-Country Summary Statistics - Oil Exporters
Number of Countries Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Private Credit 31 24.896 17.916 2.857 88.68
Bank Deposits 30 29.241 20.258 4.764 92.135
Liquid Liabilities 30 37.533 21.493 12.796 101.873
Market Cap 19 37.261 40.727 6.892 146.005
Turnover 19 21.705 20.291 0.839 67.584
Growth 31 1.432 1.536 -1.278 5.473
Non-Oil Growth 31 1.37 2.259 -3.747 6.212
Education 31 56.913 27.417 8.862 106.619
FDI 31 3.235 3.72 0.115 16.406
Oil 31 0.265 0.21 0.031 0.757
Lerner Index 19 0.32 0.116 0.063 0.501


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Unconditional Correlations - Full Sample of Countries
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Table 2.8: Private Credit and Growth: Heterogeneity across Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Private Credit 0.013 *** 0.016 ** 0.012 * 0.015 ** 0.012 *** 0.018 ** 0.014 ** 0.012
(-3.473) (2.342) (1.960) (2.255) (2.658) (2.083) (2.464) (1.491)
Private Credit x Financial Crisis -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 **
(-5.624) (-2.670) (-4.012) (-2.954) (-6.022) (-2.651) (-2.688) (-2.602)
Interactions with region dummies
Private Credit x Middle East and North Africa -0.005 * -0.009 ***
(-1.765) (-2.679)
Subgrouping 1
Private Credit x MEDA -0.007 * -0.008 *
(-1.732) (-1.879)
Private Credit x non-MEDA -0.001 0.000
(-0.364) (-0.071)
Subgrouping 2
Private Credit x GCC 0.002 0.004
(0.837) (1.138)
Private Credit x non-GCC -0.012 ** -0.009 *
(-2.018) (-1.730)
Private Credit x East Asia & Pacific -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
(-0.389) (-0.089) (-0.621) (-0.636) (-0.326) (-0.330)
Private Credit x Europe & Central Asia 0.011 ** 0.014 ** 0.011 * 0.009 0.014 ** 0.010
(2.043) (2.425) (1.734) (1.457) (2.174) (1.566)
Private Credit x Latin American & Caribbean -0.006 * -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 * -0.004 -0.005
(-1.783) (-1.181) (-1.422) (-1.928) (-1.007) (-1.165)
Private Credit x South Asia -0.008 -0.004 -0.007 -0.009 -0.004 -0.006
(-1.420) (-0.734) (-1.121) (-1.298) (-0.565) (-0.805)
Private Credit x Sub-Saharan Africa -0.008 -0.005 -0.010 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006
(-1.418) (-0.911) (-1.491) (-0.981) (-0.656) (-0.835)
Controls
Education 0.021 ** 0.022 ** 0.017 ** 0.018 * 0.018 * 0.026 ** 0.018 * 0.021 **
(2.486) (2.561) (2.036) (1.878) (1.780) (2.612) (1.914) (2.353)
Initial GDP per capita -0.015 *** -0.021 *** -0.016 ** -0.020 *** -0.013 *** -0.023 *** -0.016 ** -0.018 **
(-3.270) (-3.473) (-2.488) (-2.636) (-2.620) (-2.890) (-2.382) (-2.321)
Terms of Trade 0.354 *** 0.263 **
(3.198) (2.210)
FDI 0.348 *** 0.234 * 0.238 * 0.223 * 0.261 *** 0.138 0.156 0.205
(3.319) (1.847) (1.879) (1.804) (2.617) (1.037) (1.105) (1.486)
Government consumption -1.630 *** -1.156 **
(-3.197) (-2.067)
Constant -1.603 *** -1.060 * -0.964 * -1.194 ** -0.594 -0.684 -0.904
(-3.321) (-1.790) (-1.678) (-2.592) (-0.945) (-1.050) (-1.398)
Observations 678 678 678 630 619 630 630
Number of countries 146 146 146 144 140 144 144
AR2 0.927 0.991 0.966 0.968 0.866 0.984 0.965
Hansen 0.300 0.419 0.273 0.140 0.480 0.340 0.479
Number of instruments 76 100 100 76 92 100 100
Wald test statistic for significance of coefficient of 
Private Credit in certain regions
0.141 0.433 0.070 0.62
Wald Test is for the sum of coefficients on Private 
Credit and its Interaction with:
MEDA non-GCC MEDA non-GCC
Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth Dependent variable: Real per capita non-oil GDP growth
This table shows the results of dynamic panel regressions for growth of real total anf non-oil per capita GDP  using a GMM procedure following Arellano and 
Bover(1995). The explanatory variables are Private credit, the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP;  Education, percentage of gross secondary school 
enrollment; Initial income, initial GDP per capita; and FDI expressed as a percentage of GDP. Some specifications also include interactions between private credit and 
regional dummy variables. Data are averaged over non-overlapping five year periods beginning in 1980. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and significance at 
the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels are indicated.  
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Table 2.9: Private Credit and Growth: Heterogeneity between Oil Exporters
and other Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Private Credit 0.011 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.011 *** 0.010 * 0.009 ** 0.010 * 0.008 *
(3.033) (2.810) (2.931) (2.824) (1.949) (2.179) (1.774) (1.822)
Private Credit x Financial Crisis -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 ***
(-5.204) (-4.864) (-5.445) (-5.122) (-4.959) (-4.793) (-5.428) (-5.219)
Interactions with oil exporter variables
Private Credit x Oilexp -0.007 ** -0.004 -0.010 ** -0.010
(-2.255) (-1.438) (-2.126) (-1.600)
Private Credit x Oildep -0.030 *** -0.030 ** -0.044 *** -0.044 ***
(-3.118) (-2.021) (-3.777) (-3.108)
Private Credit x Oilexp x GCC 0.001 0.003
(-0.227) (0.503)
Private Credit x Oildep x GCC 0.031 * 0.025
(-1.903) (-1.406)
Controls
Education 0.017 ** 0.015 * 0.017 ** 0.016 * 0.015 0.011 0.013 0.012
(2.295) (1.950) (2.115) (1.913) (1.534) (1.193) (1.507) (1.290)
Initial GDP per capita -0.012 *** -0.013 *** -0.012 *** -0.012 ** -0.011 ** -0.009 * -0.010 ** -0.008 *
(-2.884) (-2.863) (-2.761) (-2.545) (-2.093) (-1.848) (-2.166) (-1.743)
Terms of Trade 0.233 * 0.281 **
(1.833) (2.532)
FDI 0.357 *** 0.276 *** 0.341 *** 0.288 *** 0.284 *** 0.186 0.295 *** 0.208 *
(3.025) (2.537) (-2.989) (-2.795) (2.888) (1.652) (3.003) (1.964)
Government consumption -1.011 * -1.278 **
(-1.711) (-2.467)
Constant -1.640 *** -1.254 ** -1.566 *** -1.315 *** -1.294 *** -0.834 -1.348 *** -0.946 *
(-2.997) (-2.472) (-2.970) (-2.751) (-2.838) (-1.584) (-2.949) (-1.908)
Observations 678 637 678 637 630 630 630 630
Number of countries 146 144 146 144 144 144 144 144
AR2 0.832 0.928 0.880 0.928 0.969 0.946 0.950 0.929
Hansen 0.278 0.098 0.328 0.299 0.096 0.066 0.255 0.218
Number of instruments 90 90 104 101 90 90 101 100
Wald test statistic for significance of coefficient of 
Private Credit in certain regions
0.337 0.074 0.151 0.232 0.984 0.009 0.645 0.318
Wald Test is for the sum of coefficients on Private 
Credit and its Interaction with:





Oilexp X GCC Oildep X GCC
Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth Dependent variable: Real per capita non-oil GDP growth
This table shows the results of dynamic panel regressions for growth of real total and non-oil per capita GDP  using a GMM procedure following Arellano and 
Bover(1995). The explanatory variables are: Oilexp, a dummy variable for oil exporting countries; Oildep, the share of oil GDP in total GDP; Private credit, the ratio of 
bank credit to the private sector to GDP;  Education, percentage of gross secondary school enrollment; Initial income, initial GDP per capita; and FDI expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. Some specifications also include interactions between private credit and either Oilexp or Oildep. Data are averaged over non-overlapping five year 
periods beginning in 1980. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and significance at the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels are indicated.  
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Table 2.10: Private Credit and Growth: Heterogeneity across Income Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Private Credit 0.017 *** -0.047 ** 0.017 *** 0.011 ** 0.013 *** 0.013 ** 0.019 * 0.027 **
(2.471) (-2.593) (3.262) (2.389) (2.879) (2.571) (1.783) (2.410)
Private Credit x Financial Crisis -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.009 *** -0.006 *** -0.006
(-4.046) (-4.090) (-3.905) (-3.847) (-3.303) (-3.435) (-4.029) (-3.944)
Interactions with variables related to income
Private Credit x LIC -0.006 -0.033 *** -0.006 -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.006 * -0.041 ***
(-1.483) (-2.395) (-1.280) (-2.795) (-2.929) (-1.721) (-2.627)
Private Credit x Income 0.009 ***
(3.092)
Private Credit x Openness -0.001 -0.003
(-0.262) (-1.019)
Private Credit x LIC x Openness 0.006 *** 0.009 **
(1.867) (2.222)
Private Credit x Bank Supervision 0.001 0.001
(0.493) (0.632)
Private Credit x LIC x Bank Supervision 0.003 0.004 *
(0.314) (1.929)
Controls
Education 0.028 *** 0.035 *** 0.024 ** 0.023 ** 0.017 *** 0.019 * 0.021 ** 0.019 **
(3.142) (5.056) (3.118) (2.178) (2.259) (1.873) (2.609) (2.509)
Initial GDP per capita -0.024 *** -0.054 *** -0.023 *** -0.020 *** -0.019 *** -0.019 *** -0.020 *** -0.020 ***
(-2.673) (-4.055) (-3.644) (-2.891) (-3.362) (-2.935) (-3.828) (-4.343)
Terms of Trade
FDI 0.298 ** 0.275 *** 0.362 ** 0.225 0.270 0.227 0.389 *** 0.373 ***
(2.479) (2.653) (2.775) (1.089) (1.348) (1.138) (2.895) (2.633)
Government consumption
Constant -1.331 *** -1.051 ** -1.625 *** -0.993 -1.180 -1.000 -1.765 *** -1.680 **
(-2.347) (-2.051) (-2.708) (-1.036) (-1.270) (-1.076) (-2.865) (-2.580)
Observations 678 677 652 407 407 407 652 652
Number of countries 146 146 142 80 80 80 142 142
AR2 0.920 0.812 0.985 0.492 0.492 0.467 0.882 0.926
Hansen 0.453 0.301 0.679 0.100 0.100 0.161 0.483 0.707
Number of instruments 96 96 109 63 63 71 109 122
\
Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth
This table shows the results of dynamic panel regressions for growth of real total per capita GDP  using a GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover(1995). The 
explanatory variables are Private credit, the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP;  Education, percentage of gross secondary school enrollment; Initial 
income, initial GDP per capita; and FDI expressed as a percentage of GDP. Some specifications also include interactions between private credit and a Low-Income 
Country (LIC) dummy variables and/or either the quality of bank bupervision, (from Abiad, et al, 2008) and the degree of trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports to 
GDP) . Data are averaged over non-overlapping five year periods beginning in 1980. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and significance at the 1 percent (***), 
5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels are indicated.  
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Table 2.11: Stock Market Turnover Ratio and Growth: Heterogeneity across
Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Turnover 0.005 ** 0.009 ** 0.008 ** 0.009 ** 0.005 ** 0.007 * 0.008 ** 0.008 *
(2.472) (2.225) (2.218) -2.411 (2.392) (1.742) (2.117) (1.964)
Turnover x Financial Crisis -0.006 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.012 *** -0.013 *** -0.012 ***
(-4.140) (-4.017) (-3.945) (-3.314) (-4.434) (-3.911) (-4.098) (-3.790)
Interactions with region dummies
Turnover x Middle East and North Africa -0.001 0.000
(-0.155) (-0.038)
Subgrouping 1
Turnover x MEDA -0.002 -0.003
(-0.303) (-0.453)
Turnover x non-MEDA -0.001 -0.001
(-0.316) (-0.079)
Subgrouping 2
Turnover x GCC 0.001 0.000
(0.374) (0.085)
Turnover x non-GCC -0.002 -0.002
(-0.397) (-0.474)
Turnover x East Asia & Pacific 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.463) (0.116) (-0.238) (0.577) (0.161) (0.198)
Turnover x Europe & Central Asia 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.012 ** 0.012 * 0.011 **
(1.508) (1.359) (1.036) (2.222) (1.834) (2.009)
Turnover x Latin American & Caribbean -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.455) (-0.598) (-0.804) (-0.612) (-0.513) (-0.566)
Turnover x South Asia -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
(-0.791) (-0.729) (-0.959) (-0.214) (-0.568) (-0.865)
Turnover x Sub-Saharan Africa -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 0.003 0.001 0.001
(-0.733) (-0.926) (-1.001) (0.346) (0.129) (0.109)
Controls
Education 0.024 ** 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.024 * 0.010 0.010 0.008
(2.263) (0.432) (0.387) (0.556) (1.887) (0.643) (0.666) (0.446)
Initial GDP per capita -0.011 *** -0.012 ** -0.012 *** -0.014 ** -0.013 *** -0.010 * -0.012 ** -0.012 **
(-4.265) (-2.358) (-2.699) (-2.408) (-3.116) (-1.789) (-2.225) (-2.095)
Terms of Trade
FDI 0.266 * 0.405 ** 0.353 * 0.333 * 0.247 * 0.243 0.247 0.285
(1.792) (2.056) (1.784) (1.781) (1.748) (1.073) (1.112) (1.448)
Government consumption
Constant -1.228 * -1.805 * -1.554 * -1.465 * -1.131 * -1.078 -1.085 -1.249
(-1.789) (-1.969) (-1.675) (-1.669) (-1.732) (-1.021) (-1.042) (-1.362)
Observations 363 363 363 363 339 339 339 339
Number of countries 104 104 104 104 101 101 101 101
AR2 0.969 0.814 0.858 0.891 0.577 0.766 0.626 0.720
Hansen 0.471 0.557 0.739 0.686 0.664 0.682 0.681 0.607
Number of instruments 76 92 95 95 76 92 95 95
Wald test statistic for significance of coefficient of 
Turnover in certain regions
0.113 0.063 0.275 0.311 0.436 0.174
Wald Test is for the sum of coefficients on Turnover 
and its Interaction with:
MENA MEDA non-GCC MENA MEDA non-GCC
Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth Dependent variable: Real per capita non-oil GDP growth
This table shows the results of dynamic panel regressions for growth of real total anf non-oil per capita GDP  using a GMM procedure following Arellano and 
Bover(1995). The explanatory variables are: Turnover, the ratio of stock market val;ue traded to GDP;  Education, percentage of gross secondary school enrollment; 
Initial income, initial GDP per capita; and FDI expressed as a percentage of GDP. Some specifications also include interactions between Turnover and regional dummy 
variables. Data are averaged over non-overlapping five year periods beginning in 1980. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and significance at the 1 percent 
(***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels are indicated.  
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Table 2.12: Stock Market Turnover and Growth: Heterogeneity between Oil
Exporters and other Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Turnover 0.004 ** 0.004 * 0.004 * 0.004 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 0.005 **
(2.299) (1.740) (1.804) (1.597) (2.026) (2.426) (2.150) (2.329)
Turnover x Financial Crisis -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.008 *** -0.010 *** -0.009 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 ***
(-4.125) (-3.649) (-3.981) (-4.222) (-5.173) (-5.042) (-5.270) (-5.203)
Interactions with oil exporter variables
Turnover x Oilexp 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.000
(-0.173) (0.645) (-0.386) (-0.087)
Turnover x Oildep -0.006 0.015 ** -0.006 0.018
(-0.751) (1.996) (-0.441) (0.690)
Turnover x Oilexp x GCC -0.004 -0.002
(-1.573) (-0.518)
Turnover x Oildep x GCC -0.028 *** -0.032
(-2.994) (-1.289)
Controls
Education 0.023 *** 0.022 * 0.021 ** 0.023 ** 0.023 * 0.024 * 0.023 ** 0.026 *
(2.808) (1.889) (2.369) (2.035) (1.974) (1.761) (2.018) (1.748)
Initial GDP per capita -0.012 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.014 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 ***
(-4.527) (-3.580) (-4.104) (-2.967) (-3.578) (-3.241) (-3.728) (-3.228)
Terms of Trade
FDI 0.277 * 0.275 0.262 * 0.253 * 0.195 0.226 0.203 0.183
(1.781) (1.641) (1.810) (1.819) (1.462) (1.544) (1.504) (1.442)
Government consumption
Constant -1.266 * -1.261 -1.202 * -1.169 * -0.877 -1.028 -0.918 -0.836
(-1.759) (-1.628) (-1.793) (-1.809) (-1.415) (-1.523) (-1.474) (-1.415)
Observations 363 343 363 343 339 339 339 339
Number of countries 104 101 104 101 101 101 101 101
AR2 0.977 0.481 0.962 0.570 0.551 0.562 0.567 0.746
Hansen 0.753 0.610 0.728 0.759 0.710 0.605 0.672 0.737
Number of instruments 90 90 95 95 89 89 94 94
Wald test statistic for significance of coefficient of 
Private Credit in certain regions
0.102 0.876 0.728 0.216 0.363 0.973 0.620 0.395
Wald Test is for the sum of coefficients on Private 
Credit and its Interaction with:





Oilexp X GCC Oildep X GCC
\
Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth Dependent variable: Real per capita non-oil GDP growth
This table shows the results of dynamic panel regressions for growth of real total and non-oil per capita GDP  using a GMM procedure following Arellano and 
Bover(1995). The explanatory variables are: Oilexp, a dummy variable for oil exporting countries; Oildep, the share of oil GDP in total GDP; Turnvover, the ratio of stock 
market value traded to GDP;  Education, percentage of gross secondary school enrollment; Initial income, initial GDP per capita; and FDI expressed as a percentage of 
GDP. Some specifications also include interactions between turnover and  either Oilexp or Oildep. Data are averaged over non-overlapping five year periods beginning in 
1980. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and significance at the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels are indicated.  
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Table 2.13: Stock Market Turnover and Growth: Heterogeneity across Income
Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Turnover 0.007 *** 0.006 0.007 *** 0.013 *** 0.011 *** 0.012 *** 0.002 0.004
(2.771) (0.563) (2.458) (2.799) (3.768) (3.409) (0.225) (0.446)
Turnover x Financial Crisis -0.009 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.015 *** -0.011 *** -0.014 -0.008 *** -0.007 ***
(-3.628) (-3.374) (-3.207) (-4.106) (-3.628) (-4.371) (-3.840) (-2.916)
Interactions with variables related to income
Turnover x LIC -0.003 0.019 -0.004 -0.011 ** -0.010 * -0.002 0.024
(-0.884) (0.668) (-1.761) (-2.463) (-1.904) (-0.674) (0.930)
Turnover x Income 0.000
(0.066)
Turnover x Openness 0.002 0.001
(0.848) (0.432)
Turnover x LIC x Openness -0.006 -0.007
(-0.743) (-1.002)
Turnover x Bank Supervision -0.001 -0.001
(-0.718) (-0.910)
Turnover x LIC x Bank Supervision 0.007 * 0.007
(1.970) (1.407)
Controls
Education 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.022 ** 0.021 ** 0.019 *** 0.003 0.009
(0.748) (0.889) (1.330) (2.026) (2.626) (2.653) (0.220) (0.754)
Initial GDP per capita -0.011 ** -0.010 -0.011 *** -0.017 *** -0.017 *** -0.016 *** -0.010 ** -0.011 ***
(-2.187) (-1.597) (-3.082) (-4.721) (-4.889) (-4.605) (-2.128) (-2.880)
Terms of Trade
FDI 0.312 ** 0.299 * 0.612 *** 0.008 0.283 * 0.296 0.533 *** 0.557 ***
(2.008) (1.799) (5.396) (1.165) (1.727) (1.381) (4.734) (5.470)
Government consumption
Constant -1.389 * -1.342 * -2.787 *** 0.000 -1.265 * -1.327 -2.397 *** -2.523
(-1.931) (-1.755) (-5.337) (0.000) (-1.661) (-1.341) (-4.638) (-5.449)
Observations 363 363 349 292 292 292 349 349
Number of countries 104 104 100 74 74 74 100 100
AR2 0.890 0.820 0.930 0.950 0.978 0.943 0.840 0.891
Hansen 0.793 0.834 0.868 0.014 0.638 0.653 0.963 0.975
Number of instruments 96 96 103 68 63 71 108 116
\
Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth
This table shows the results of dynamic panel regressions for growth of real total per capita GDP  using a GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover(1995). The 
explanatory variables are Turnover, the ratio of stock market value traded to GDP;  Education, percentage of gross secondary school enrollment; Initial income, initial 
GDP per capita; and FDI expressed as a percentage of GDP. Some specifications also include interactions between private credit and a Low-Income Country (LIC) dummy 
variables and/or either the quality of bank bupervision, (from Abiad, et al, 2008) and the degree of trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) . Data are 
averaged over non-overlapping five year periods beginning in 1980. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and significance at the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), 
and 10 percent (*) levels are indicated.  
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Figure 2.1: Average Annual Real Per Capita GDP Growth Rate 1975-2005
(percent)
Figure 2.2: Financial Depth by Region and Countries
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Figure 2.3: Deepening in the Banking Sector, Across Regions, 1975-2008
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Figure 2.4: The Ratio of Private Credit to Deposits, 1975-2008
Figure 2.5: Estimated Impact of Increases in Credit-to-GDP on Real Per
Capita Growth (Percentage Points)
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Figure 2.6: Estimated Marginal Impact of Increases in Private Credit-to-GDP
on Growth at Different Income Levels (Percentage Points)
Figure 2.7: Estimated Differences between LICS and non-LICs in the Growth
Impact of Private Credit at Different Levels of Bank Supervision Quality (Per-
centage Points)
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Figure 2.8: Estimated Differences between LICS and non-LICs in the Growth
Impact of Private Credit at Different Levels of Trade Openness (Percentage
Points)
Figure 2.9: Estimated Increase in Long-Run Growth from an Increase in Stock
Market Turnover by 20 Percentage Points of GDP, at Different Initial Levels
of Turnover
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Figure 2.10: Banking Sector Performance in MENA Countries Relative to
Emerging and Developing Country Average to Sub-Saharan Africa, 2008
Figure 2.11: Financial Access, Use of Banking Services, and Depth across
Income Groups, 2008
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Figure 2.12: Financial Access and Banking Depth (Privy) across Countries
Figure 2.13: Share of Public and Foreign Banks throughout the World, 2002
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Chapter 3
International Trade and Financial Crises: The
Role of Credit Conditions
Exporting firms are among those affected the most during and after
financial crises in countries. However, it is not vivid why contractions in ex-
ports are uneven among different industries. I investigate the impact of severe
financial crises on industry level exports by exploiting the measures of financial
vulnerability across sectors. I use five digit SITC exports of United Nations
Commodity Trade (UN-Comtrade) database for 27 manufacturing industries
in 15 countries hit by severe financial crises during the period 1975 - 2005. The
data is then combined with sector-specific measures of asset tangibility and
dependence on external finance to carry out the difference-in-difference and
dynamic panel estimations. This paper adds to the literature in three ways.
First, it provides a theoretical framework to provide insight on why sectors
are hit disproportionately during and in the aftermath of severe financial dis-
tresses. The findings suggest that industries with greater reliance on outside
financing and fewer shares of tangible assets experience greater contractions
in export volumes in the years following a severe financial crisis. Second, it
comprises empirical estimations that support the theoretical conclusions and
confirm that the results are more robust for the industries with relatively
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higher reliance on outside funding and fewer tangible assets. Furthermore, it
exhibits support for the complementarity between private credit by deposit
money banks and asset tangibility in relation to the volume of exports.
3.1 Introduction
Research has shown that exporting sectors are significantly affected
during and after financial crises. Based on the study by Chor and Manova
(2012), the decline in world trade in the last quarter of 2009 was approxi-
mately 12% after the global financial crisis. That contraction exceeds twice
the average loss in GDP in the same period, around 5.4%. Such dramatic
collapses in exports following financial crises are usually associated with dif-
ferent factors including negative shocks in supply. However, it is not vivid
why contractions in exports are uneven among different industries. It is also
interesting to find out to what extent they are related to supply shocks such
as greater restrictions in access to outside funding, as well as how different
industries’ exports are influenced by tighter credit conditions.
Bernard and Jensen (1999, 2004) argue that exporting establishments
are on average more productive than domestic operating firms. However, they
could potentially be affected more acutely by a financial distress due to the
presence of fixed costs necessary to enter foreign markets. Furthermore, the
impact might be adverse due to the existence of heterogeneity in financial
vulnerabilities across sectors. Such observations raise questions about the
impact of tighter credit constraints on exports in industries, and the ways by
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which those sectors are affected in response to the constraints. Do sector-
specific financial vulnerabilities act as channels between financial distresses
and contractions in exports? Is it possible to disentangle the channels through
which these factors affect exports? With these questions in mind, this paper
focuses on fifteen severe and relatively well known financial crises since World
War II1. The series of financial distresses are presented in Table 3.1. Five
incidences pertain to cases from advanced economies, which are considered to
be more severe and systemic by Reinhart and Reinhart (2010), and the other
ten episodes belong to emerging economies with midlevel incomes. In order to
investigate the cross-industry contractions in exports during and in the years
following the mentioned series of financial crises, five digit SITC level data
on worldwide exports are employed in this study. The data, as explained in
Section 3.3, is obtained from the depository of UN-Comtrade database.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) employed the difference-in-difference econo-
metric methodology for the first time to illustrate that industries with higher
reliance on external financing benefit more when a country develops its finan-
cial system. Using a similar approach, Fisman and Love (2003) showed that
sectors which are more dependent on trade finance tend to grow at a faster
pace. Similarly, Braun (2003) found evidence that the growth rate is faster
in sectors with higher shares of tangible assets. Other studies such as Beck
(2002, 2003) and Manova (2008) argued that sectors which are highly depen-
1Financial crises episodes are derived from Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) which include
fifteen post-second World War scenarios of severe financial distresses between 1975 and 2005.
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dent on outside financing have greater shares of exports in more financially
developed countries. The latter study attributes its findings to the lower lev-
els of search costs for intermediaries in developed economies. Manova (2008)
also found that at low levels of financial development, industries with more
tangible assets tend to export more. Concerns related to the endogeneity and
reverse causality of empirical regressions are reduced by using the difference-
in-difference approach in the above mentioned literature. However, this study
employs the dynamic panel methodology, a frequently used method in the
growth and finance literature as in Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), to ob-
tain more reliable estimates from the efficiency and consistency perspectives.
In the following empirical exercises, the uneven impact of financial crises on
industry exports are captured by the multiplication of a measure of financial
vulnerability with a dummy indicating the years after a financial distress.
To the author’s knowledge, Chor and Manova (2012) and Iacovone and
Zavacka (2009) are the only studies that investigated the effects of banking
and the recent global financial crises on industry-level exports. However, these
papers suffer from few drawbacks in the view of this paper. First, none of the
studies supports its empirical findings with a theoretical framework. Second,
this paper’s theoretical model along with its empirical exercises agree that
shares of industry-specific asset tangibility are not significant channels between
financial crises and exports unless explored under a certain condition. More
specifically, exports in particular industries show greater and statistically more
significant resilience to the negative macroeconomic shocks during financial
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crises. Those sectors are the industries that need to borrow relatively larger
than the amount they have in terms of tangible assets. Third, this paper shows
that private credit by deposit money banks2 and shares of tangible assets are
complementary to each other forming the volume of exports. Furthermore,
this paper argues that the results are valid only for the severe financial crisis
episodes. In other words, the results are statistically insignificant for the set
of all banking crisis episodes used in the latter study by Iacovone and Zavacka
(2009). One may note that this paper exploits the dynamic panel methodology
to eliminate the concerns pertaining to the biases and inefficiencies potentially
caused by the presence of reverse causality, omitted variables and endogeneity
of the covariates. Also, different control variables, such as growth in terms
of trade and lagged volume of exports, are employed in the regressions for
robustness checks3.
Some other less relevant papers have focused on the effects of macro-
level shocks on exports. Borensztein and Panizza (2006) found that during
sovereign defaults, industries with higher tendencies to export, acquire higher
losses. Another study by Berman (2009) argued that currency devaluation has
an ambiguous effect on exports during the periods of currency crises.
2For the purpose of this paper, private credit is used interchangeably with private credit
by deposit money banks
3Another drawback of Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) is that the convergence effect for
industry-level exports growth is captured by lagged shares of industries in total exports of
the home country. Such a measure is problematic since industry-level exports and total
exports in a country might be contracted simultaneously. Hence, the variable they used
could not be a proper measure to capture the convergence impact - an effect that implies
industries with larger exports grow at slower paces.
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The contributions of the present study are of three folds. First, it
provides a theoretical framework based on Manova (2013) to provide insights
on the fact that industries are hurt adversely in the aftermath of a financial
crisis depending on their financial vulnerabilities. For instance, sectors with
higher dependence on outside financing and fewer shares of tangible assets
are contracted disproportionately and to a greater extent. The model also
predicts that the same effects are more significant for the sectors with greater
reliance on outside financing along with those having fewer tangible assets such
as land, property and equipment. Second, theoretical findings are confirmed
by empirical estimations using the difference-in-difference and dynamic panel
methodologies. However, the results do not generally apply for any set of
banking crisis scenarios, as for the set of incidences of banking crises used
in Iacovone and Zavacka (2009). Finally, there is strong empirical support for
the complementarity between private credit by deposit money banks and asset
tangibility of industries in the exports.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 3.2 provides a
theoretical model to show that sector-specific credit conditions are the chan-
nels through which crises affect exports. Section 3.3 provides a description
of the datasets devoted to this study. Section 3.4 illustrates the econometric
methodologies and confirms theoretical findings with empirical results. Finally,




This paper employs a theoretical model similar to that used by Manova
(2013) who incorporated credit conditions of firms in a Melitz (2003) interna-
tional trade framework. The current conducted study is different in the sense
that it investigates sector-specific effects of financial crises and the decrease in
repayment probability of investment on exports rather than those in the cases
of financial liberalizations or declines in contract enforceability.
Households have utilities over their consumption of different varieties of
goods in multi-sector environments. Utility is formulated as a Cobb-Douglas
function over sector-specific consumption with a Constant Elasticity of Sub-
stitution (CES) equal to ε > 1. The maximization problem of a representative
household can be represented as:
Maximizing Uj = ΠiC
δi
ij ,
where share of each industry in total expenditure is δi, and Cij represents
the aggregate industry-specific consumption over all possible varieties, w, in
country j and industry i:








qij(ω) denotes quantity of consumption for each variety and the set of
available varieties is represented by Ωij. Representing total expenditure on all
goods (or income) in country j by Ij, the demand for each variety of sector i
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and pij(ω) is the price of variety w in country j, and Pij is the price index of
industry i in the same country.
A static framework is assumed in which firms should pay a fixed cost of
entry cijfej before learning their productivity levels. cij is interpreted as the
cost of a cost-minimizing input, which is specific to the industry and country
of origin. The productivity level of a firm is denoted by 1
θ
, where θ is drawn
independently from a cumulative distribution F (θ) with a strictly positive
support [θL θH ] which is the same across all countries. However, due to the
differences in marginal costs of production, it costs a firm cijθ to produce one
unit. Similar to Manova (2013), it is supposed that a fraction ti ∈ (0, 1) of the
entry costs are spent on collateralizable assets such as land, equipment and
property. Braun (2003) argued that this fraction is inherent to the nature of
industry and he called it the measure of asset tangibility.
For simplicity, it is assumed that once a firm enters the market and
finds out its productivity level, there is no fixed cost of production for domestic
market. This is due to the assumption that cash flows from operations fulfill
the financing of domestic activities. However, a firm incurs a cost equal to
cijfjk and iceberg cost of shipping, τjk to export from home country j to
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country k. fjj is normalized to zero and fjk is strictly positive for any country-
pair. Although one may assume that variable costs are financed internally,
firms need to borrow a proportion di of their fixed costs of exports by raising
capital from outside funding. This fraction will be referred to as the degree of
external financial dependence throughout the paper.
In an ideally reliable financial system, all investors may expect that all
contracts would be fully repaid. However, depending on the financial stability
which could be hit by a financial crisis and the degree of dependence on outside
financing, a creditor in country j expects that the contract in industry i will
be paid with probability 1 − ρij. Otherwise, on average, a firm is expected
to default with the probability ρij in which the investor claims the collateral
ticijfej. ρij is considered to be exogenous to the model and increasing in
reliance on outside financing. For example, it is more probable that a firm in
an industry highly dependent on external financing incurs greater decline in
the stock market, and thus higher liabilities.
Denoting repayment by H(θ), as a take-it-or-leave-it offer, the profit
maximization problem of a firm can be written as:
maxp,q,H(θ) πijk(θ) = pijk(θ)qijk(θ)− qijk(θ)τjkcijθ − (1− di) cijfjk
−(1− ρij)H(θ)− ρijticijfej




(2)pijk(θ)qijk(θ)− qijk(θ)τjkcijθ − (1− di)cijfjk ≥ H(θ)
(3)− dicijfjk + (1− ρij)H(θ) + ρijticijfej ≥ 0,
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where the left hand side of (2) is the maximum amount a firm with type θ can
offer to an investor and (3) is the participation constraint for a creditor with
zero outside option. In a competitive investment market, one might assume
that the latter constraint is binding. Furthermore, it is straightforward to
see that there is a productivity cutoff, 1
θ∗
, for which the second constraint is
binding; firms with productivity levels greater than the cutoff attain sufficient
credit to operate in the exports market, while others with less productivity
levels become financially constrained, although probably profitable in the ex-
ports market. Therefore, solving the constraints for the cutoff productivity












)1−εδiIj = 0. (3.1)
Plugging the binding constraints into the profit function, it is straight-
forward to show that successful exporters gain positive profits, i.e., profits are
positive for exporters with productivity levels greater than 1
θ∗
if:
difjk > tifej. (3.2)
The above condition states that credit conditions affect export decisions
of firms when they need to borrow relatively larger than the amount they
have in terms of tangible assets. This intuitive condition is confirmed with
the empirical results in Section 3.4. One might obtain comparative statics
based on the implicit function 3.1 to study uneven and cross-industry effects of





∝ −ε(ticijfej − dicijfjk)
ρ2ij
> 0. (3.3)
The comparative static above indicates that in case of crisis and the
consequent decline in the probability of repayment in an industry, productivity
cutoff for participation increases. Hence, some firms exit the exports market,
which leads to a decrease in total exports. In addition, in industries with higher
dependence on outside funding or lower shares of tangible assets, productivity
cutoff level is higher for the firms. In other words, in such industries, credit
conditions are tougher for the firms to restore confidence among the customers








1−ρij cijfej < 0. (3.4)
Furthermore, in the presence of credit conditions, one would test the










cijfej < 0. (3.5)
The equations above contain intuitive implications. They suggest that
a change in productivity cutoff is pronounced in industries with higher reliance
on external financing and is mitigated in sectors with greater tangible assets.
These theoretical findings are confirmed in Section 3.4 by empirical analyses.
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3.3 Data
Four sources of data are employed in this study to perform empiri-
cal estimations. Fifteen episodes of severe post-World War II financial crises
between the years 1975 and 2005 are extracted from Reinhart and Reinhart
(2010). Table 3.1 includes the list of countries and the years each of which
experienced a financial crisis. Five of those episodes pertain to the more severe
and systemic crises in advanced economies, five belong to the asian financial
crisis and the rest five incidences are related to midlevel income economies.
Observations include a wide range of economies from lower income countries
such as Indonesia to developed countries such as Norway.
The United Nations Commodity Trade Database, also known as UN-
Comtrade, provides detailed and disaggregated exports data for over 140 coun-
tries in the world. Five digit SITC Rev. 2 data for worldwide exports are
collected for the list of fifteen countries during the period 1970 - 2005. The
SITC codes are converted to their corresponding ISIC Rev. 2 codes using
Haveman’s correspondence table4. The disaggregate data is available in the
current dollar value and in free on board measures for every single commodity,
and exports are aggregated to match the classification of the main exogenous
variables, i.e., aggregate exports at the ISIC industry level.
Two measures of industry-specific financial vulnerabilities are used in
this study to investigate the heterogenous effects of financial crises on exports
4http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/trade.resources/Concordances
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across industries . Braun (2003) provides measures of dependence on external
financing and asset tangibility for the manufacturing sectors. He employs fi-
nancial dependence, originally calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998), which
measures the share of capital expenditure of firms not financed by either inter-
nal funds or operations for a median publicly-listed US company using Com-
pustat database. The other measure he used, which is also considered to be
inherent to the nature of industry, is the median asset tangibility. This mea-
sure is calculated in terms of the share of hard assets in each industry, i.e.,
net property, equipment, land and plant over total assets. The description
of industries with their corresponding ISIC codes and financial vulnerability
measures are provided in Table 3.2. Furthermore, Table 3.3 indicates that
there exists a small negative correlation between these two measures, i.e., the
industries high in dependence on outside financing do not necessarily have
lower shares of tangible assets.
Other control variables such as annual real per capita GDP of countries
and their terms of trade in goods and services are obtained from the World
Bank publicly available database. Furthermore, private credit is obtained from
a World Bank research dataset by Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009). The
latter measures the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP for





This paper examines the effects of financial crises on exports’ growth
using two econometric methodologies. These methods enable us to investigate
whether or not sectors with greater financial vulnerabilities are hurt more
during and after a severe financial crisis. The first approach is the difference-
in-difference econometric analysis. It was suggested by Rajan and Zingales
(1998), and a few studies such as Manova (2008) have exploited it to identify
sector-specific channels between financial crises and exports. The dynamic
panel methodology is the second econometric method conducted in this study.
It is a widely employed method in the growth and finance literature as in Beck,
Levine and Loayza (2000) and Beck and Levine (2004) which tackle concerns
with efficiency and consistency of estimates. The following two subsections
provide a brief description of both methodologies.
3.4.1.1 Difference in Difference
The differential impact of financial crises across different industries is
studied by considering a baseline difference-in-difference regression as:
∆Xijt = αXij,t−1 + βZiCrisisjt + Controlijt + λt + λij + εijt, (3.6)
where Xijt denotes the total exports of industry i in country j at year t. Hence,
∆Xijt, which serves as the dependent variable, is the growth in exports for the
116
same sector-country-year pair5. Zi is the time-invariant financial vulnerability
of industry i described in Section 3.3. The measures defining the vulnerability
are external financial dependence and asset tangibility which are considered
inherent to the nature of industries based on Braun (2003). The time-frame
studied for each country extends between from three years before the date
of financial crisis to three years after6. Crisisjt is an indicator for country j
which is equal to one for the years after a financial crisis in that country, and
zero otherwise. Controlijt is the set of control variables used in the regressions
for the purpose of robustness checks. It varies from having no control variables
to including terms of trade in goods and services, real GDP per capita and
private credit by deposit money banks. To control for the convergence effect,
lagged value of exports in the same country and industry is also included. One
might expect α to be negative indicating that industries with larger exports
tend to grow at slower pace. Other independent variables including λt and
λij are the fixed effects which control for long term growth trends of industry-
country pairs. Furthermore, the error term of the regression is denoted by
εijt.
The main variable of interest is the interaction of financial vulnerability,
either financial dependence or asset tangibility, with the crisis dummy. Finding
a statistically significant estimate of β would confirm the existence of channels
5To exclude the outliers, exports with values less than 10 thousand dollars are dropped
from the panel. Also, exports are included in the regressions in natural logarithm terms.
6The time window is also checked for 2 years and 4 years for the purpose of robustness
check, both of which resulted in similar findings.
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through industry-specific tighter credit conditions affecting the exports during
and after a severe financial crisis. Furthermore, a negative coefficient means
that during a crisis, an industry with greater financial vulnerability is affected
more and experiences greater decline in exports. On the other hand, a positive
β implies that more vulnerable sectors are more resilient to crisis shocks.
One might run the following regression as a substitute for equation
3.6 in which the dependent variable is the volume of exports rather than the
growth of exports for the same industry-country pair:
Xijt = (α + 1)Xij,t−1 + βZiCrisisjt + Controlijt + λt + λij + εijt. (3.7)
It is straightforward to see that unbiased estimates of equations 3.6
and 3.7 would result in the same coefficients for all covariates except for the
convergence effect that would appear with a one unit difference.
3.4.1.2 The Dynamic Panel Methodology
The difference-in-difference methodology mitigates the biases caused by
the endogeneity of dependent variables, and controls for omitted variables by
the inclusion of fixed effects. However, to tackle the endogeneity and reverse
causality issue, the present paper exploits the dynamic panel methodology.
Financial crises might be influenced by the same causes or shocks that may
affect exports performance. On the other hand, poor exports performance
might trigger a financial crisis in a country. These concerns are resolved by
using the system of method of moments in a dynamic panel framework.
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All independent variables, excluding the strictly exogenous covariates,
such as the fixed effects dummies, are assumed to be weakly exogenous (or
predetermined). In other words, they are only affected by the present and
past levels of exports growth and uncorrelated with future innovations. With
this assumption, the two-step dynamic panel approach with Windmeijer (2005)
standard error correction is used. This approach is a widely used econometric
methodology in the finance and growth literature as in Aghion (2009). The
method is proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998), and it is based on an earlier method introduced by Arellano and Bond
(1991). For empirical exercises with smaller time frames relative to the number
of observations7, the methodology combines two sets of moments to obtain
unbiased and efficient estimates. One set is derived from the equation in levels
and the other set from the equation in differences.
Equation 3.8 below is obtained by the first differencing Equation 3.6. It
is clear that all time-invariant variables will be dropped in effect to differencing.
As in the difference-in-difference method, this reduces the concerns related to
the potential biases caused by omitted variables.
∆Growth(Xijt) = α∆Xij,t−1+βZi∆Crisisjt+∆Controlijt+∆λt+∆εijt, (3.8)
where ∆Yijt = Yijt − Yij,t−1 for any variable Y . Although the endogeneity
concerns related to omitted variables are not present in the above equation, the
7Roodman (2006) argues that if the number of time periods is not small relative to the
number of observations, one should be concerned about the consistency of the estimates
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new differenced equation introduces a new correlation between the difference
of lagged exports, or ∆Xij,t−1, and the error term. Arellano and Bond (1991)
obtain a set of moment conditions using the weak exogeneity assumption of
the independent variables. Those predetermined variables are hence used as
instruments for the differenced equation:
E[fij,t−s∆εijt] = 0 ∀t ≥ 3, s = 2, (3.9)
where fijt denotes the set of all endogenous and weakly exogenous variables
including the lagged exports, as well as other control variables, such as real
per capita GDP and lagged value of terms of trade.
The second set of moment conditions are obtained based on the original
regression in levels (Equation 3.6). Assuming that lagged differences of the
independent variables are uncorrelated with the error term, another set of
moment conditions are obtained as:
E[∆fij,t−s(λij + εijt)] = 0 ∀t ≥ 3, s = 2. (3.10)
Stacking all the moments from the equations in levels and differences,
a two-step GMM estimation is performed. Error terms are assumed to be
independent and homoskedastic in the first step. At the end of the first stage,
variance-covariance matrices are estimated, based on which another GMM
estimation is performed. This process allows for the dependence and het-
eroskedasticy of error terms.
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3.4.2 Empirical Results
3.4.2.1 Difference in Difference
The empirical results confirm the theoretical findings by statistically
robust and significant estimates. External financial dependence is used as
the measure of financial vulnerability in Table 3.5. Different combinations
of the control variables are included in the regressions to check the robust-
ness of the results8. Columns (4) - (6) also include the interaction of private
credit and financial dependence, in addition to other control variables. The
difference-in-difference regressions suggest that the main coefficient of interest,
β, for the interaction of financial dependence and the crisis dummy, is nega-
tive and statistically significant. Therefore, exports in the sectors with higher
reliance on external financing are affected more severely in the years following
severe financial crises. The coefficient varies between -0.106 and -0.125 de-
pending on the control variables used in the econometric model. The impact
is outstanding and suggests that financial dependence is an important channel
through which industries’ exports are affected in the aftermath of financial
crises. For instance, Industrial Chemicals sector has an external financial de-
pendence which is less than the average of all industries. In this example, the
least expected decrease in exports for an average manufacturer in that sec-
tor, implied by the smallest coefficient, -0.106, would be around 2.2% after a
financial crisis in the home country. This example illustrates how significant
the role of financial dependence could be as a channel between financial crises
8Standard errors are calculated by clustering countries and industries together.
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and exports in industries. One might also notice that the coefficient β has an
absolute value less than one in all the regressions. It is consistent with the
econometric model based on both regressions 3.6 and 3.7. Based on the latter
equation, (α+1) is the correlation between the lagged and the current volume
of exports (measured in levels), a parameter expected to be positive. In other
words, industries with greater volumes of exports tend to export more in the
future.
Other control variables also present intuitive results with statistically
significant coefficients. As expected, the coefficient α in Equation 3.6 is nega-
tive, which is an evidence for the widely accepted convergence effect. In other
words, industries with greater levels of exports grow at a slower pace relative
to the sectors with smaller exports volumes. Furthermore, the inclusion of
lagged growth of terms of the trade in goods and services illustrates a negative
impact of that variable on exports. This means that for a certain country,
greater growth in terms of trade leads to lower growth rate in exports.
Although the empirical results exhibit that external financial depen-
dence acts as a channel for the process by which financial crises affect exports,
they do not show such strong impact for asset tangibility in general. Table 3.6
presents the results of the same regressions as in Table 3.5 with the difference
that asset tangibility is used as the measure of financial vulnerability rather
than the reliance on outside financing. The coefficients for the interaction of
asset tangibility of industries and the crisis dummy are positive. However, the
coefficients are diverse and statistically insignificant. Thus, greater shares in
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tangible assets do not necessarily translate into higher resilience towards the
shocks by financial crises.
Although it seems that shares of tangible assets do not operate as sig-
nificant channels through which a crisis may affect exports, the inclusion of
their interaction with private credit leads to intriguing estimation results. Ac-
cording to the estimations reported in columns (4) - (6) of Table 3.6, strong
and positive estimates of the coefficient suggest that as private credit increases
in a country (relative to GDP of the same country), industries with greater
asset tangibilities grow faster in the exports market. One might interpret this
effect as an evidence for the existence of a kind of complementarity between
private credit and collateralizable assets. In other words, greater access to
private credit gives room to the firms to maintain their assets and grow in
the exports market. Such an effect could be of interest to policy makers in
deciding how to allocate private credit efficiently among sectors in the after-
math of a financial crisis. First, as mentioned in the Introduction, exports are
usually hurt severely during a financial crisis. The decline in exports some-
times exceeds twice the size of decline in economic growth; therefore, instant
policy actions should be made to save the exporting industries. Second, the
ratio of private credit to GDP decreases during and after the years following a
severe financial crisis, an evidence quantified by Reinhart and Reinhart (2010).
Therefore, private credit, which serves as a determinant of growth9, becomes
9It is a widely empirical concept that private credit by deposit money banks enhance
growth. Examples are the seminal works by Beck and Levine (2004), Levine (2004) and
Levine and Zervos (1998)
123
scarce and should be allocated more carefully.
3.4.2.2 Dynamic Panel
As expressed earlier in Section, the frequently used difference-in-difference
methodology mitigates the biases caused by omitted variables and reverse
causality. Therefore, to address the concerns related to the efficiency and con-
sistency of the estimates, as well as the robustness of the results, this section
provides the results of the dynamic panel methodology. The outcomes re-
ported in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 exhibit implications similar to the ones presented
by the difference-in-difference econometric model. Financial dependence is a
channel through which a financial crisis may adversely hit industries, where
there is no such a significant impact for the share of tangible assets. Like-
wise, exports in sectors highly relying on outside funding are more affected.
However, magnitudes of impacts are slightly less relative to those obtained by
the difference-in-difference methodology. Furthermore, the convergence effect
is captured. It is also noticed that sectors in economies with higher growth
rates in terms of trade experience lower growth rates in exports.
To quantify the heterogenous impact of a severe financial crisis on
exports, one could calculate the cross sector difference of the impact based
on the level of financial dependence of sectors. Take the Textile industry,
with the mediocre level of 0.400, and the professional and scientific equip-
ment sector, with a high level of financial dependence, 0.961. Based on
the estimations in column (3) of Table 3.7, the differential impact of a cri-
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sis on the exports of these two industries would be 0.097 (obtained from
−0.111×{log(0.961)− log(0.400)}). It implies that Textile firms would suffer
%9.7 less contraction in exports than the industries pertaining professional
and scientific equipment in the aftermath of a crisis.
One might wonder if similar impacts are detected for financial crisis
episodes different from the fifteen scenarios used in the present study. Iacovone
and Zackara (2009) identify 21 banking crisis episodes that occurred in the
developed and developing countries between the period 1980-2000. This paper
investigated the same experiments and applied the econometric estimations for
the mentioned 21 banking crisis incidences. Unlike the results for the fifteen
post-World War II financial crises, there was no statistically strong evidence
that financial dependence or asset tangibility acts as a channel through which
banking crises are linked to poor exports performance. The difference between
the results by Iacovone and Zackara (2009) and those in this paper could be
according to two main reasons. First, they use a series of banking crises while
this paper uses incidences of severe financial crises. A non-severe banking crisis
might not decrease the probability of repayment in investment as intensely as a
severe financial crisis does. Furthermore, this paper uses UN-Comtrade data at
a more disaggregated level (i.e., 5 digit rather than 4 digit SITC exports) which
may considerably influence the significance and preciseness of the results.
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3.4.2.3 Does Magnitude of Financial Vulnerability Matter?
The theoretical model suggests that under the condition by Equation
3.2, credit constraints play important roles in the firms’ decision whether to
operate in the exports market or not. A firm might be potentially profitable in
the exports market but unable to do so because of the borrowing constraints.
Therefore, one should expect that the comparative statics (illustrated by Equa-
tions 3.5) be more robust when the measures of financial vulnerabilities satisfy
Equation 3.2. To test this hypothesis, this paper investigated the difference-in-
difference and dynamic panel regressions for a particular sample of industries..
This particular sample is selected from the industries whose dependence on
outside financing are greater than the mean (i.e., 0.253) and shares of tangible
assets are higher than the average (i.e., 0.304)10. It is interesting to observe
that for this sample of industries, asset tangibility works as a channel through
which financial crises affect exports. Table 3.9 suggests that for such a sam-
ple (industries with relatively higher reliance on outside financing and fewer
tangible assets), the greater the share of tangible assets, the more resilient the
industry exports are to the negative shocks of financial crises. This finding
is consistent with the theoretical model and exhibits statistically more signifi-
cant estimates, an observation that is absent when using the whole sample of
sectors.
10This method is employed due to the limitations in data, since neither of the fixed costs
fij and feji could be estimated.
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3.5 Conclusion
Although manufacturing sectors in a country operate in similar financial
environments, they demonstrate different degrees of resilience towards financial
distresses. Firms in some sectors experience dramatic declines during and in
the aftermath of financial distresses, while those in other industries display
less vulnerabilities. This study provides strong evidence that credit conditions
play important roles in the way exporting establishments are affected in the
aftermath of severe financial crises.
This paper focused on 15 episodes of severe post-World War II financial
crises, and the uneven contractions in the exports of 27 manufacturing indus-
tries. The theoretical model along with two econometric methodologies, the
difference-in-difference and the more precise dynamic panel regressions, iden-
tified channels through which a crisis could disproportionately affect exports.
Industries with higher reliance on outside funding experience greater
contractions in exports in the years following a financial distress. Adversely,
sectors with more tangible assets show more resilience to the negative shocks
by tighter credit conditions. Intuitively, this is because such industries can
use their land, equipment, plant, etc. as collaterals to attain funding. More-
over, the results imply that all these effects are more significant in industries
with relatively greater financial dependence and fewer tangible assets. In addi-
tion, the fact that both indicators of credit conditions are uncorrelated makes
the empirical results more intriguing since they capture different aspects of
financial vulnerability.
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Interestingly, credit conditions do not generically act as channels through
which any crisis might affect export volumes. The results are not robust for
the set of banking crises used by Iacovone and Zavacka (2009), although they
prove to be important determinants of the impact of severe financial crises on
exports (the episodes classified by Reinhart and Reinhart (2010)).
Finally, empirical findings provide evidence that asset tangibility and
private credit are complementary to each other in shaping exports patterns.
In other words, sectors with more tangible assets benefit to a greater extent
in response to deeper financial developments (measured by the ratio of private
credit by deposit money banks to the real GDP). Therefore, policy makers
may use private credit as a tool to boost growth in exports in the industries
with more tangible assets.
Policy makers should take into account the vulnerability of different
sectors to increase the resilience of industries during financial crises. The
significance is not only to safeguard industries against domestic financial dis-
tresses, but also to protect them from negative spillover effects of foreign slow-
downs. Financial stresses spread rapidly among the economies and transmis-
sion channels are growing with the integration of the world financial markets.
Considering characteristics of the exporting sectors, suitable policies should
be employed to lower fragility in exports market. Long term policies may
include structural reforms, such as increasing labor market mobility, in order
to enable vulnerable companies cut their costs rapidly during busts. Other
short term policies, such as directed lending, and providing social safety nets
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should also accompany proactive considerations in order to effectively support
the exporting industries.
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Table 3.1: Financial Crisis Episodes
















Source: 15 episodes of severe post-World War II financial crises during 1975 -
2005, identified by Reinhart and Reinhart (2010).
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Table 3.2: Industry Financial Vulnerability
ISIC Industry Fin.Dep. Tang
311 Food products 0.137 0.378
313 Beverages 0.077 0.280
314 Tobacco -0.451 0.221
321 Textiles 0.400 0.373
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.029 0.132
323 Leather products -0.140 0.091
331 Wood products, except furniture 0.284 0.380
332 Furniture, except metal 0.236 0.263
341 Paper and products 0.176 0.558
342 Printing and publishing 0.204 0.301
352 Other chemicals 0.219 0.197
353 Petroleum refineries 0.042 0.671
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products 0.334 0.304
355 Rubber products 0.227 0.379
356 Plastic products 1.140 0.345
361 Pottery, china, earthenware -0.146 0.075
362 Glass and products 0.529 0.331
369 Other non-metallic products 0.062 0.420
371 Iron and steel 0.087 0.458
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.006 0.383
381 Fabricated metal products 0.237 0.281
382 Machinery, except electrical 0.445 0.183
383 Machinery, electric 0.768 0.213
384 Transport equipment 0.307 0.255
385 Prof and scient equipment 0.961 0.151
390 Other manufactured products 0.470 0.188
3511 Industrial chemicals 0.205 0.412
Notes: Based on Rajan and Zingales (1998), Fin.Dep. measures the share of
capital expenditure of firms not financed by either internal funds or operations
for a median publicly-listed US company. Tang is the median asset tangibility
calculated as the share of hard assets in each industry, i.e., net property,






Notes: Based on Rajan and Zingales (1998), Fin.Dep. measures the share of
capital expenditure of firms not financed by either internal funds or operations
for a median publicly-listed US company. Tang is the median asset tangibility
calculated as the share of hard assets in each industry, i.e., net property,
equipment, land and plant over total assets.
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Fin.Dep. 27 0.253 0.330 -0.451 1.140
Tang 27 0.304 0.137 0.075 0.671
Notes: Based on Rajan and Zingales (1998), Fin.Dep. measures the share of
capital expenditure of firms not financed by either internal funds or operations
for a median publicly-listed US company. Tang is the median asset tangibility
calculated as the share of hard assets in each industry, i.e., net property,
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